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 Although management scholars have examined various antecedents of punishment in the 
workplace, there has been scant research on how perceptions of the organizational context 
influence decision-making regarding punishment.  Building on the work of Cameron and 
colleagues (Cameron, Bright, & Caza, 2004; Cameron & Caza, 2002), I propose that one’s 
perceived organizational forgiveness – the perception of the extent to which the workplace is 
forgiving – is negatively related with one’s punitive intent in response to ethical misconduct.  In 
addition, I identify variables involving the disciplinary agent and the ethical misconduct itself as 
moderators of this relationship.  In a lab study and a field study, I tested the main effect of 
perceived organizational forgiveness and the moderating effects of these other variables on 
punitive intent.  Data from the lab study provided evidence of the hypothesized main effect and 
suggested that the effect holds when the disciplinary agent is high in accountability and when the 
misconduct has resulted in serious damage to the organization.  Data from the field study 
suggested that the negative relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and 
punitive intent seemed to hold only when an experience of being forgiven is salient in the mind 
of the disciplinary agent and there are mitigating circumstances surrounding the ethical 
misconduct that is the subject of punishment.  Surprisingly, the field study results suggested a 
positive relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent when an 
experience of being denied forgiveness is salient to the disciplinary agent.  The limitations of 
these studies and potential implications of the findings are then discussed.    
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Punishment is an integral part of organized social life (Bandura, 1969; Carlsmith, 2006; 
Spitzer, 1975).  Not surprisingly, the use of punishment, or at least the threat of punishment, has 
always been present in organizational settings (Arvey & Ivancevich, 1980; Atwater, Waldman, 
Carey, & Cartier, 2001).  At some point in time, managers find themselves in a position where 
they have to impose sanctions of some form on a subordinate, ranging from oral or written 
reprimands to suspension from work or even termination (Beyer & Trice, 1984; Butterfield, 
Treviño, & Ball, 1996).  Co-workers punish each other too, in the form of ostracism, scolding, 
and even sabotage (e.g., Barker, 1993; Struthers, Miller, Boudens, & Briggs, 2001).  Far from 
being uncommon in the workplace, punishment is unlikely to vanish from the organizational 
landscape (Sims, 1980; Treviño, 1992).   
In the management literature, there has been substantial research on the consequences of 
punishment, particularly in terms of its impact on the attitudes and subsequent behavior of the 
punished individual (i.e., the issue of punishment “effectiveness”; e.g., Ball, Treviño, & Sims, 
1993, 1994; Bennett, 1998; Podsakoff, Bommer, Podsakoff, & MacKenzie, 2006).  Moreover, 
the effects of punishment on the perceptions and performance of non-punished organizational 
members have also been examined (e.g., Atwater, Camobreco, Dionne, Avolio, & Lau, 1997; 
Niehoff, Paul, & Bunch, 1998; O'Reilly & Puffer, 1989; O'Reilly & Weitz, 1980; Treviño, 1992).  
To a lesser extent, management researchers have studied the antecedents of punishment, 
proposing a number of frameworks with which to further investigate managerial decisions to 
punish and the choice of punishment form or tactic (Arvey & Jones, 1985; Butterfield et al., 




antecedents has incorporated the role of organizational context variables in shaping punishment 
decisions (e.g., Beyer & Trice, 1984; Klaas & Dell'omo, 1997), much of this research has 
focused on formal aspects of the organizational context (e.g., formal organizational systems, 
written policies and procedures, explicitly-stated managerial role requirements, or the presence 
of a union).  To date, there has been scant research on how perceptions of the organizational 
context influence decision-making regarding punishment.  Because an employee’s perceptions of 
his or her workplace do not necessarily coincide with other “objective” or independent 
assessments of that same workplace (Brief & Weiss, 2002), and because the influence of the 
organizational context on punishment decisions (as well as many other individual behaviors, for 
that matter) is likely to be mediated by individual perceptions (Leigh, Lucas, & Woodman, 
1988), perceptions of the organizational context are arguably more crucial than objective aspects 
of the organizational context in understanding and predicting individual employee decision-
making and behavior, including the imposition of punishment (Bensman & Gerver, 1963; James, 
Hater, Gent, & Bruni, 1978).   
 Understanding how perceptions of organizational context serve as antecedents to 
punishment decisions has important implications for the theory and practice of managing 
organizations.  Given that managerial decisions with respect to disciplining employees do not 
always reflect formal specifications for punishment established by their organizations (Blount, 
2003; Fairhurst, Green, & Snavely, 1986; Klaas & Dell’omo, 1991), integrating perceptions of 
organizational context into theories of punishment allows management researchers to develop 
more comprehensive models of punishment in workplace settings.  In terms of practice, 
understanding the influence of these perceptions can provide managers with options to attenuate 




that come with punishing subordinates, such as employee resentment (Day, 1971), perceived 
leader ineffectiveness (Atwater, Dionne, Camobreco, Avolio, & Lau, 1998), or even legal 
problems (Brett, Atwater, & Waldman, 2005). 
In this dissertation, I examine how an individual’s punitive decision is shaped by his or 
her perception of the extent to which the workplace is forgiving, which I refer to as perceived 
organizational forgiveness.  Although forgiveness and punishment are distinct constructs, they 
have been inextricably linked by philosophers and theologians – and at times perceived as 
inversely related (see Halling, 1994; Lewis, 1980; Senyshyn, 1998; Talbott, 1993; Tutu, 1999).  
Research in psychology and management suggests that individual victims who have decided to 
forgive their transgressor are less inclined to punish and take revenge against that transgressor 
(e.g., Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2006; Bradfield & Aquino, 1999).  However, we know little about 
how one’s perceptions and experience of forgiveness in a workplace context shapes one’s 
punitive reactions to transgressions in which one is not directly the victim, as is the case in many 
organizational and even criminal justice contexts (Karstedt, 2002).   
Building on the work of Cameron and colleagues (Cameron, Bright, & Caza, 2004; 
Cameron & Caza, 2002), and integrating extant research on both forgiveness (e.g., Worthington, 
2005) and punishment (e.g., Butterfield et al., 1996; Darley & Pittman, 2003), I present 
propositions describing how and when perceived organizational forgiveness shapes one’s 
punitive intent in response to ethical misconduct.  In this chapter, I first present a theoretical 
overview of punishment.  I then introduce the concept of perceived organizational forgiveness 
and develop a number of propositions regarding the relationship between perceived 
organizational forgiveness and punitive intent.  Lastly, I summarize the propositions and point 




and Three, I present two studies I conducted to empirically test the propositions in the model.  In 
Chapter Four, I discuss my findings and present conclusions as well as directions for future 
research. 
A Theoretical Overview of Punishment 
Integrating elements from definitions proposed by Treviño (1992) and Vidmar and Miller 
(1980), I define punishment as the imposition of a negative sanction on, or the withdrawal of a 
positive outcome from, someone perceived to have violated a rule, norm, or expectation.  In 
conceptualizing punishment this way, I necessarily exclude non-contingent punishment behavior 
(i.e., punishment imposed on an individual independent of whether that individual committed a 
violation or not; e.g., Podsakoff, Todor, Grover, & Huber, 1984).  I also relax a number of 
assumptions inherent in some of the definitions previously provided by management scholars, 
such as the assumption that the primary motivation underlying punishment is to see a decrease in 
the frequency of some undesirable behavior (Ball & Sims, 1991) or the assumption that 
punishment is applied by a superior (e.g., supervisors or managers) on a subordinate (Treviño, 
1992).  In the context of this dissertation, I focus on punishment intentions, which I refer to as 
punitive intent, recognizing that there may be discrepancies between the intended severity of a 
punishment and its actual implementation (cf. Ajzen, 1985).  In addition, I will refer to the 
individual tasked with deciding on the punishment to be imposed as the disciplinary agent.   
In the context of a workplace, punishment may be used in response to various forms of 
misconduct (Treviño, 1992), including poor performance (e.g., Heerwagen, Beach, & Mitchell, 
1985; Trahan & Steiner, 1994), or interpersonal transgressions or “hurts” (Worthington, Berry, 
Shivy, & Brownstein, 2005).  In this dissertation, I consider punitive intent in response to ethical 




Treviño, 1992).  Examples of these include pilfering office supplies, lying, or coming to work 
under the influence of alcohol.  Such misconduct is identified by a disciplinary agent either 
directly (e.g., the supervisor actually witnesses a specific behavior or episode of behaviors), or 
indirectly, in which case a flag or indicator suggests that misconduct has most likely occurred 
(Arvey & Jones, 1985).  Furthermore, in focusing on situations in which the disciplinary agent is 
not directly the victim of the misconduct, I distinguish punishment from revenge, which may 
also have punitive dimensions (Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2001, 2006; Zaibert, 2006). 
Previous reviews and theoretical models of punishment in organizational settings (e.g., 
Arvey & Jones, 1985; Butterfield et al., 1996; Podsakoff, 1982) have identified the 
organizational context as a class of antecedents that influences an individual’s decision to punish, 
the choice of punishment tactic, and the severity of the punishment imposed.  By context, I mean 
the “situational opportunities and constraints that affect the occurrence and meaning of 
organizational behavior as well as functional relationships between variables” (Johns, 2006, p. 
386), including factors associated with the organization, events transpiring within an 
organization, and social relationships existing within an organization.  Setting aside features of 
the misconduct itself, which constitute a class of antecedents on their own (see Arvey & Jones, 
1985; Podsakoff, 1982), a number of workplace-related variables have been shown to influence 
punishment behavior.  For instance, a disciplinary agent’s span of control, his or her formal 
reinforcement power (i.e., whether the disciplinary agent has the option of punishing and 
rewarding, as opposed to simply punishing), and the structure and complexity of the task with 
respect to which a negative sanction is imposed all shape the frequency with which punishment 




With respect to sanctioning ethical misconduct in the workplace, the antecedent that has 
received the most research attention has been the set of formal organizational policies regarding 
punishment.  Many, if not most, organizations have formal procedures specifying the conditions 
and the extent to which sanctions and punishment may be imposed on employees (Arvey & 
Jones, 1985; Cassell, Johnson, & Smith, 1997; Franklin & Pagan, 2006).  Empirical evidence 
suggests that the more a formal policy is perceived as applicable to misconduct, the more severe 
a suspension from work is imposed on a violator (Beyer & Trice, 1984).  Qualitative evidence 
suggests that the mere existence of these disciplinary policies and procedures creates 
expectations of punishment that compel managers to punish (Butterfield et al., 1996). However, 
the more restrictive a formal disciplinary policy is, in terms of imposing stricter requirements or 
more stringent standards with respect to defining offenses and documenting evidence regarding 
offenses, the less managers are willing to impose severe punishment, such as dismissal (Klaas & 
Dell'omo, 1997).   
Underlying the effects of organizational policy on punishment decisions is the 
disciplinary agents’ perceptions of such formal policies.   Unfortunately, missing from extant 
research is an examination of how punishment decisions are shaped by perceptions about aspects 
of the organizational context, including the informal elements such as non-written norms and 
rules formulated by employees themselves (e.g., Hollinger & Clark, 1982), non-institutionalized 
socialization processes (e.g., Jones, 1986), and affective events in the workplace (Weiss & 
Cropanzano, 1996).   
 To address this gap, I examine the relationship between one such perceptual variable, 
perceived organizational forgiveness, and the severity with which one intends to punish an 




Perceived Organizational Forgiveness 
Cameron and Caza (2002, p. 39) defined organizational forgiveness as an organization’s 
capability “to foster collective abandonment of justified resentment, bitterness, and blame” and 
to adopt “positive, forward-looking approaches in response to harm or damage.”  In their work, 
Cameron and colleagues conceptualized organizational forgiveness as an institutional inclination 
to encourage members not to dwell on past offenses, even when no remorse is demonstrated 
(Cameron et al., 2004; Cameron & Caza, 2002).  As a dimension of organizational virtuousness, 
Cameron and Caza (2002) described organizational forgiveness as being manifested in individual 
actions as well as collective activities or processes that promote moral goodness and social 
betterment.  To clarify this conceptualization, I highlight several points. 
First, the notion of organizational forgiveness necessarily involves an interpersonal 
dimension (Cameron & Caza, 2002).  Several scholars argue that forgiveness is an inherently 
intrapersonal phenomenon (for a review, see Worthington, 2006), and research on forgiveness in 
workplace settings has been consistent with this view, focusing on the affect and cognition 
within the forgiving individual (e.g., Aquino, Grover, Goldman, & Folger, 2003; Aquino et al., 
2006).  However, characterizing organizations as being more forgiving versus less forgiving is 
possible only on the basis of overt manifestations, expressions, or signals of forgiveness.  These 
manifestations take the form of transactions and communication processes between offended 
parties and the individual(s) perceived to have perpetrated the offense (Kelley, 1998; Waldron & 
Kelley, 2005).  It is possible that offended parties may constantly be forgiving co-workers who 
have offended them by letting go of feelings of anger and negativity without overtly 
demonstrating forgiving behaviors – a phenomenon referred to by Baumeister, Exline, and 




construct necessarily assumes the expression of forgiveness in some form between or among 
organizational members.   Such expressions of forgiveness may be indirect or non-verbal, by 
way of acts such as smiling or resuming normal patterns of interaction with an offender (e.g., 
Montiel, 2000; Snook, 2005).  As a caveat, although some scholars insist that forgiveness 
necessarily involves replacing negative cognitions, emotions and motivations with positive ones 
(e.g., Cameron & Caza, 2002; Wade & Worthington, 2005), there is some consensus that 
forgiveness transpires when these cognitions, emotions, and motivations towards a transgressor 
become less negative (McCullough, Fincham, & Tsang, 2003).   
Second, even though organizational forgiveness inherently has an interpersonal 
dimension, the harm or damage in response to which forgiveness may be forthcoming need not 
necessarily be personal.  Organizational members can abandon resentment and blame not only 
over hurts or interpersonal offenses, but also over performance-related mistakes or missteps for 
which their co-workers are responsible (Cameron et al., 2004).  More importantly, however, 
forgiving and forgoing blame do not preclude imposing negative sanctions on the individual(s) 
responsible for the harm or damage, even in legal and clinical contexts (e.g., Enright, Eastin, 
Golden, Sarinopoulos, & Freedman, 1992; Krapp, 2005).  Even with reference to interpersonal 
offenses, for which forgiveness may be seen as removing or cancelling an interpersonal debt, or 
refraining from revenge (Aquino et al., 2006; Exline & Baumeister, 2000; Wallace, Exline, & 
Baumeister, 2008), forgiving does not, by definition, mean the absence of sanctions or acts of 
restitution.  At least in principle, forgiveness does not imply minimizing, condoning, or ignoring 
transgressions (e.g., Enright & Fitzgibbons, 2000; Murphy, 2002). 
Third, although organizational forgiveness is conceptualized as an institutional capacity 




discount that objective characteristics of the workplace associated with positive approaches to 
dealing with harm and damage (e.g., formal rules and policies that urge employees to “move on” 
and not dwell on mistakes) may make an organization appear forgiving.  However, descriptions 
and assertions regarding the extent to which an organization is forgiving are likely to arise from 
employees’ interactions with each other and with elements of the organizational context, and 
may be perceived differently from one employee to the next, as a facet-specific psychological 
climate (Ashforth, 1985; James & Sells, 1981; Schneider & Reichers, 1983).  Therefore, 
examining perceived organizational forgiveness may prove to be a more fruitful avenue for 
explaining variance in individual-level decisions, specifically punitive intent.   
I define perceived organizational forgiveness as an individual’s perception and belief that 
the organization and the organizational members are quick to forgive mistakes and missteps by 
other organizational members.   Conceptually, I distinguish perceived organizational forgiveness 
from two constructs that may be closely related to it: psychological safety and managerial 
ruthlessness.  Perceived organizational forgiveness is narrower in scope than psychological 
safety, a team-level climate construct defined as “a shared belief that the team is safe for 
interpersonal risk taking” (Edmondson, 1999, p. 354).  Psychological safety encompasses the 
perception that one’s team members are open to discussing problems and issues, are willing to 
help, and are appreciative of one’s uniqueness as well as contributions (Edmondson, 1999; 
Edmondson, Bohmer, & Pisano, 2001).  Perceived organizational forgiveness subsumes that 
aspect of psychological safety concerning the belief that others in the organization “tolerate 
failure without retaliation, renunciation, or guilt” (Schein & Bennis, 1965, p. 45), and that honest 
mistakes can be made without fear of reprisal (Edmondson, 1996).  With respect to managerial 




feelings that managers exhibit when confronting subordinates, perceived organizational 
forgiveness is not a polar opposite.   Individuals who do not perceive their managers to be 
ruthless may still tend to see their organization as less forgiving.   
When an individual’s perceived organizational forgiveness is high, he or she is likely to 
view work colleagues and supervisors as quick to forgive mistakes and missteps by other 
organizational members.  As such, the individual sees organizational members as refraining from 
(1) blaming individuals responsible for mistakes, interpersonal conflict, or failure, (2) harboring 
grudges or ill-feelings towards such individuals, and (3) engaging in acts of retribution.  Such 
high perceived organizational forgiveness might well have resulted from the individual’s 
observation of instances in which other organizational members have actually refrained from 
blaming, harboring grudges, and committing acts of revenge against individuals who have failed, 
made mistakes, or hurt them (cf. Ashforth, 1985).  To the extent that individuals seek to achieve 
adaptive fit with their intra-organizational environment (Burke, Borucki, & Hurley, 1992), and 
that perceived organizational forgiveness, as a climate variable, suggests what attitudes and 
behaviors are acceptable (e.g., Dieterly & Schneider, 1974; Litwin & Stringer, 1968; White & 
Lam, 2000), organizational members who perceive their workplace to be highly forgiving may 
also collectively generate these incidents of forgiveness in response to mistakes.  To wit, they 
will also tend to be more forgiving and less likely to blame, harbor grudges, or engage in 
revenge.  Conversely, when an individual’s perceived organizational forgiveness is low, he or 
she sees the workplace as being unforgiving.  Such a perception might well be based on 
observations of individuals experiencing negative sanctions for their missteps and bad decisions, 




section, I discuss how perceived organizational forgiveness is likely to influence punitive intent 
in response to ethical misconduct. 
Perceived Organizational Forgiveness and Punitive Intent 
Perceived organizational forgiveness may influence punitive intent in reaction to ethical 
misconduct in two ways: by serving as a heuristic in making punishment decisions, and by 
increasing a disciplinary agent’s ethical tolerance. 
Perceived Organizational Forgiveness as a Heuristic 
Because no disciplinary agent can have complete information regarding an unethical act, 
such as the mitigating circumstances surrounding an offense, or the extent to which a perpetrator 
was responsible for the offense, decision-making regarding punishment necessarily involves 
judgment under uncertainty (see Englich, Mussweiler, & Strack, 2006). Not surprisingly, 
disciplinary agents rely on heuristics or rules of thumb to simplify the process of punitive 
judgment (cf. Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  Presumably, they also actively seek to compare 
their punishment judgments with those of other people (Festinger, 1954).  In organizational 
settings, individuals seek information on what attitudes and behaviors are appropriate in the 
workplace from their organizational environment (Schneider, 1975).  Thus, perceptions about the 
organizational environment readily serve as rules of thumb that shape individual judgment and 
behavior (Forehand & Gilmer, 1964).  With respect to making punishment decisions, I propose 
that perceived organizational forgiveness serves as a heuristic, an anchor that tends to bias 
punitive intent in a downward manner (cf. Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).   
An assumption underlying the anchoring process in judgment is the existence of a 
“correct” solution (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  With respect to judgment involving 




opposed to excessive (e.g., Darley, Carlsmith, & Robinson, 2000; King, 1995) could be 
considered the analogue of “correctness” of the punishment solution.  Not surprisingly then, 
experimental research has demonstrated that the magnitude of punishment imposed by 
individuals is subject to anchoring effects.  Participants asked to play the role of a juror impose 
harsher verdicts (i.e., more severe convictions) when they consider options beginning with the 
harshest possible verdict and subsequently move to the more lenient alternatives, than when they 
do the opposite by considering options starting from the most lenient (Greenberg, Williams, & 
O'Brien, 1986).  Evidence also suggests that aside from the magnitude of conviction, punitive 
damages and sentences (i.e., the punishments themselves) are anchored by prosecutor demands 
(Englich & Mussweiler, 2001) and plaintiffs’ requests (Hastie, Schkade, & Payne, 1999).  These 
anchoring effects appear to be independent of an individual’s awareness that the anchors are 
randomly generated (Englich et al., 2006).  In addition, anchoring effects in imposing sentences 
are true not only of jury-eligible lay persons (Hastie et al., 1999) but also of professional and 
experienced prosecutors and judges (Englich & Mussweiler, 2001).   
Although the standard experimental paradigm for investigating anchoring effects has 
involved numerical anchors (see Epley & Gilovich, 2001), non-numerical information from 
observed events, prior experience, and situational context may also serve as anchors for 
quantitative and qualitative judgments (e.g., Epley, Keysar, Boven, & Gilovich, 2004; 
McNamara & Bromiley, 1999; Roberts & Edwards, 1989).  Perceived organizational forgiveness 
is one such non-numeric yet relevant anchor for a disciplinary agent when determining what 
punishment level is appropriate, particularly when she is presented with an ordinal set of 
punishment options to choose from.  This is because perceived organizational forgiveness 




treated (or are supposed to be treated) by other organizational members.  Specifically, when the 
disciplinary agent’s perceived organizational forgiveness is high, she will tend to think in terms 
of minimizing blame and negativity towards a transgressor.  Consequently, she will view the 
appropriate punishment for ethical misconduct as located on the lower end, rather than the higher 
end, of the range of options available to her.  In effect, high perceived organizational forgiveness 
serves as an anchor that biases the disciplinary agent to choose punishment with a low severity.  
On the other hand, when the disciplinary agent’s perceived organizational forgiveness is low, she 
will tend to think in terms of holding a transgressor accountable and emphasizing the (negative) 
repercussions of an offense.  As a result, she will view the appropriate punishment as located at 
the higher end of the range of punishment options.  Effectively, low perceived organizational 
forgiveness serves as an anchor that biases the disciplinary agent to select a more severe 
punishment.  
Perceived Organizational Forgiveness and Ethical Tolerance 
Aside from acting as an anchor that downwardly influences punishment choices, 
perceived organizational forgiveness also negatively influences punitive intent by increasing the 
ethical tolerance of the disciplinary agent.  By ethical tolerance, I mean the extent to which an 
individual is willing to justify behavior that is unethical or at the least, ethically-suspect (Cullen, 
Parboteeah, & Hoegl, 2004; Parboteeah, Bronson, & Cullen, 2005; Smith, 1997; Weeks, 
Longenecker, McKinney, and Moore, 2005). As opposed to an individual’s ethical relativism, 
defined as the extent to which one rejects universal moral rules in favor of rules based on 
situation-specific contingencies or individual values (Forsyth, 1980), ethical tolerance is not 
necessarily a stable individual difference trait.  Moreover, ethical tolerance has been 




opposed to ethical relativism, which measures the perceived specificity (versus the 
generalizability) of moral rules and standards across situations.   
With high perceived organizational forgiveness comes the perception of signals and 
behaviors from other organizational members that discourage not just negative feelings, but also 
blaming and retaliation when things go wrong.  Such signals and behaviors may be subtle and 
indirect, are very rarely written down in formal documents, and are, for the most part, 
experienced by individuals high in perceived organizational forgiveness through their personal 
intra-organizational relationships.  As such, they constitute an informal sanctioning system 
(Tenbrunsel, Smith-Crowe, & Umphress, 2003) that provides guidelines with respect to dealing 
with mistakes and interpersonal transgressions.   
Typically, organizations have a formal sanctioning system that punishes individuals for 
ethical misconduct (e.g., Arvey, Davis, & Nelson, 1984).  An informal sanctioning system that 
may exist even just in the mind of the individual high in perceived organizational forgiveness 
presents a competing standard of appropriate and acceptable behavior simply by existing side-
by-side with the formal sanctioning system.  This competition between the formal and informal 
sanctioning systems is exacerbated by the fine line that often distinguishes relational 
transgressions and honest mistakes on one hand, and ethical misconduct on the other (see Arvey 
& Jones, 1985).  Presented with a situation that calls for a response to ethical misconduct, an 
individual high in perceived organizational forgiveness will perceive two equally legitimate 
bases for action.  One is a formal sanctioning system that demands that the misconduct be 
punished “by the book.” The other is an informal sanctioning system that is “forgiving” and 
treats the misconduct as an honest mistake with respect to which the organization needs to move 




weak sanctioning system that leads individuals to engage in less sophisticated moral reasoning, 
overlooking ethical dimensions that may arguably be clear cut.  Over time, this weak sanctioning 
system promotes ethical fading, (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004) or ethical degradation (Gino & 
Bazerman, 2006), psychological processes with which individuals gradually fail to see the moral 
components and implications of a decision or action.  Thus, individuals high in perceived 
organizational forgiveness eventually become more ethically tolerant. 
In turn, this increased tolerance for ethical misconduct leads to lower punitive intent in 
dealing with such misconduct.  Faced with the task of sanctioning another member’s unethical 
action, a disciplinary agent who is high in ethical tolerance is more likely to see the act as more 
justifiable, and consequently less morally reprehensible, than does an agent who is low in ethical 
tolerance.  This lower sense of moral outrage over ethical misconduct leads the disciplinary 
agent to impose a less severe sanction (Kahneman, Schkade, & Sunstein, 1998; Darley & 
Pittman, 2003). 
 Conversely, low perceived organizational forgiveness presents no such competing 
informal sanctioning system.  Individuals who see their organizations as unforgiving will 
perceive competing standards against which to evaluate ethical misconduct.  Offenses of any 
kind will be seen simply as offenses, whether they are honest mistakes, interpersonal hurts, or 
acts of ethical misconduct.  Consequently, individuals low in perceived organizational 
forgiveness will be concerned with holding people found guilty of ethical misconduct 
accountable to the extent that the formal sanctioning system specifies.  Thus, low perceived 
organizational forgiveness is unlikely to breed ethical tolerance, but instead increases the 
likelihood that disciplinary agents will become more attentive to the unethical nature of the 




disciplinary agents low in perceived organizational forgiveness will tend to punish more severely 
than those who are high in perceived organizational forgiveness. 
Proposition 1:  Perceived organizational forgiveness will be negatively related to 
punitive intent in response to ethical misconduct, such that disciplinary agents who 
perceive their work organization to be forgiving will be less punitive than those who 
perceive their work organization to be unforgiving. 
Moderating Influences 
 Research on decision-making involving punishment suggests that there are clusters of 
antecedents that potentially moderate the influence of a disciplinary agent’s perceived 
organizational forgiveness on his or her punitive intent in response to ethical misconduct.  These 
clusters of variables revolve around the disciplinary agent and the ethical misconduct itself. 
The Disciplinary Agent 
Empirical research exploring individual-level antecedents of punishment decision-
making suggests that stable individual differences on the part of the disciplinary agent shape his 
or her attitudes towards punishment decisions.  For instance, Sargent (2004) reported evidence 
from three studies suggesting that individuals who have a low need for cognition (i.e., those who 
typically avoid effortful cognitive activity; Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996) tend to be 
very supportive of punitive measures in response to general societal crime, compared to those 
high in the need for cognition.   
In addition, an individual’s beliefs and values also influence the severity with which he or 
she punishes another found guilty of a transgression.  For instance, with respect to punishing 
unethical business transactions, Giacalone, Fricker, and Beard (1995) found evidence that one’s 




transgressions.  Specifically, individuals who are low in ethical relativism tend to be harsher in 
punishing individuals found to have engaged in bribing a foreign official than those high in 
ethical relativism.  As another example, one’s belief in and endorsement of the Protestant Work 
Ethic (PWE; Mirels & Garrett, 1971; Weber, 1904/1958) is positively correlated with the 
severity with which one imposes negative sanctions (Christopher, Marek, & May, 2003; 
Christopher & Schlenker, 2005).  Because individuals high in PWE believe that one’s economic 
fortunes can only be the result of one’s hard work, they tend to make internal, as opposed to 
external, attributions for an individual’s behavior.  As such, individuals high in PWE tend to 
view individuals found guilty of ethical misconduct as being primarily responsible for their 
actions, and consequently, tend to punish more severely.  Finally, substantial empirical evidence 
suggests that right-wing authoritarianism – a tendency to value conformity, tradition, security, 
and power – is positively related not only to support for punitive measures already imposed on a 
guilty transgressor, but also to punitive intent in response to fictional transgressions (e.g., 
Feather, 1996; Griffitt & Garcia, 1979; Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998). 
Beyond individual differences in stable dispositions or values, the situational context of 
the individual tasked to punish another found guilty of ethical misconduct may also influence the 
severity of his or her punitive intent.  Here, I focus on two such contextual factors: the 
disciplinary agent’s accountability and the transgression experience salient to him or her. 
  Accountability.   Accountability may be defined as “being answerable to audiences for 
performing up to certain prescribed standards, thereby fulfilling obligations, duties, expectations, 
and other charges” (Schlenker, Britt, Pennington, Murphy, & Doherty, 1994, p. 634).  An 
individual who is accountable is one who, implicitly or explicitly, expects to be called on to 




Individuals who make decisions in organizational settings, including those who have to impose 
negative sanctions for ethical misconduct in organizations, are likely to experience such 
accountability for their choices (Quinn & Schlenker, 2002).   
 Empirical evidence supports the assertion that accountability has the potential to induce 
more complex and critical thinking, influencing how individuals encode and analyze 
information, thereby attenuating the impact of heuristics and judgmental biases (e.g., Siegel-
Jacobs & Yates, 1996; Tetlock, 1985; Tetlock & Kim, 1987; Webster, Richter, & Kruglanski, 
1996).  With respect to making judgments regarding the guilt of fictional transgressors, 
accountable individuals were less likely (than those who were unaccountable) to be influenced 
by the order in which evidence and information were presented (Tetlock, 1983), and were more 
likely to consider situational constraints faced by a transgressor, before assigning attributions of 
responsibility (Lerner et al., 1998). 
That said, accountability is not a unitary phenomenon.  There are various types of 
accountability that differ along various dimensions, such as the extent to which the views of the 
audience are known and the degree to which that audience is well-informed (Lerner & Tetlock, 
1999, 2003).  Cumulative evidence suggests that there are only certain conditions under which 
accountability elicits the cognitive effort necessary to reduce judgmental biases, and that under 
some other conditions, accountability may even amplify bias, ironically, through effortful 
thinking (Lerner & Tetlock, 2003).   
In particular, assuming that the decision-maker’s audience desires accuracy in judgment, 
is knowledgeable about the decision task, and has a legitimate basis for asking the individual to 
justify her decision, Lerner and Tetlock (2003) proposed that a crucial consideration is extent to 




Empirical evidence (e.g., Quinn & Schlenker, 2002; Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 1989; see 
Lerner & Tetlock, 2003 for a review) suggests that when a decision-maker is aware of the 
specific views, or even just the general preferences, of a legitimate and competent audience, she 
is more likely not only to engage in conformity and to adopt what she sees as the socially 
acceptable position, but also to engage in defensive bolstering (Tetlock, et al., 1989): effortful 
thinking to selectively use information, with the view of justifying a decision.  On the other 
hand, when a decision-maker is unaware of the views or expectations of her audience, her desire 
not to appear foolish to this audience is more likely to motivate her to engage in effortful 
thinking and pre-emptive self-criticism.   
More specific to decision-making involving punishment, Pennington and Schlenker 
(1999) reported that individuals recommended harsher punishments for a student accused of 
cheating when they expected to justify their recommendation in a face-to-face meeting with a 
representative from the student honor court than when the meeting was with the accusing 
professor herself.  That the honor court representative was described as having no preference as 
to the outcome of the case (e.g., with respect to leniency towards the accused) underscores the 
influence of accountability to an “unknown audience” on punitive intent.  In a follow up study, 
where the professor was reported to have expressed the opinion that punishment should be 
commensurate with the seriousness of an offense such as the reported cheating, participants 
accountable to this professor recommended a harsher punishment than those who were scheduled 
to meet (and were therefore accountable to) the accused student (Pennington & Schlenker, 1999).   
Importantly then, the potential moderating influence of accountability on the negative 
relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent will depend on the 




When the disciplinary agent is accountable to an intra-organizational audience, as is quite often 
the case in organizations (Quinn & Schlenker, 2002), the effect of perceived organizational 
forgiveness on punitive intent will likely be amplified.  More specifically, an agent whose 
perceived organizational forgiveness is high will tend to punish a transgressor even less severely 
when she is accountable to one or more of her colleagues than when she is not accountable at all.  
To begin with, the disciplinary agent’s high perceived organizational forgiveness will operate to 
anchor her decision on the lower end of a range of punishment options.  When she is made 
accountable to other members of the organization, the prospect of having to justify her “low” 
punishment choice to an audience whom she expects to value giving second chances and 
minimizing blame will serve to motivate her to defensively bolster her decision.  Such defensive 
bolstering is likely to take the form of effortful thought involving greater attention to cues, facts, 
and even information gaps that may support such a low punishment decision, and conversely, 
less attention to cues, facts, and information gaps that may suggest an increase in punishment 
level.  As a result, this disciplinary agent is unlikely to adjust her initial punishment choice 
upward, and with additional information supporting a low punishment, may even be likely to 
punish even less severely, if at all possible.  Thus, on average, a disciplinary agent high in 
perceived organizational forgiveness will tend to punish less severely when she is accountable to 
an intra-organizational audience than when she is not accountable to anyone at all.   
Analogously, a disciplinary agent whose perceived organizational forgiveness is low will 
tend to punish a transgressor even more severely when she is accountable to another 
organizational member than when she is not accountable at all.  Faced with an increased 
likelihood of having to defend her “high” punishment choice to an audience whom she expects to 




bolstering.  This time, though, her attention and cognitive effort will be directed towards cues, 
facts, and information gaps that support severe punishment, or possibly an increase in punitive 
response.  Consequently, she is less likely to adjust her initial punishment choice downward, and 
may even be likely to impose a more severe punishment, if at all possible.  On average, 
therefore, a disciplinary agent low in perceived organizational forgiveness will tend to punish 
more severely when held accountable to an intra-organizational audience, than when held 
unaccountable.  The net effect is an amplification of the negative relationship between perceived 
organizational forgiveness and punitive intent.   
Underlying this amplifying effect are two important assumptions pointed out by Lerner 
and Tetlock (2003).  The first is that the disciplinary agent learns that she or he is accountable 
prior to evaluating the ethical misconduct and considering options for punishment severity.  This 
pre-decisional timing of accountability awareness is a necessary condition to motivate 
individuals to become more conscious of their thinking processes and in this case, to strategically 
be selective of information they need to justify their punishment decision to their audience 
(Tetlock & Kim, 1987; Tetlock et al., 1989).  While post-decisional accountability may have the 
potential to enhance defensive bolstering, it may also not have an effect on an individual’s 
cognitive processes (Lambert, Cronen, Chasteen, & Lickel, 1996; Tetlock et al., 1989; see Lerner 
& Tetlock, 1999 for a review).   
The second assumption is that the disciplinary agent does not need to be trained to 
acquire special or technical skills necessary to make the necessary judgment or decision.  Pre-
decisional accountability will not have any influence on attenuating bias when such bias comes 
from not knowing crucial decision rules, or when the decision-maker is unable to correct his or 




found guilty of ethical misconduct is unlikely to involve legal expertise, this assumption is 
tenable.  Thus, individuals who perceive the workplace to be forgiving and who are accountable 
to an intra-organizational audience will tend to be less punitive than those who also perceive the 
workplace to be forgiving but are not accountable.  Conversely, individuals who perceive the 
workplace to be unforgiving and who are accountable to an intra-organizational audience will 
tend to be more punitive than those who also perceive the workplace to be unforgiving but are 
not accountable.   
Proposition 2:  Accountability to an intra-organizational audience will amplify the 
negative relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent, 
such that the relationship will be stronger among disciplinary agents whose 
accountability is high rather than low. 
Salient transgression experience.  Every human being has committed some form of 
transgression, either of the relational (interpersonal) or non-relational type (e.g., Worthington et 
al., 2005).  Assuming that a transgression has been observed by a victim or by another 
individual, transgressors in organizational settings are likely to have experienced being forgiven, 
or conversely, being unforgiven for what they have done (or what they have failed to do).  Such 
an experience of being forgiven or unforgiven can influence the relationship between 
organizational forgiveness and punitive reactions to transgressions.  As an affective event (Weiss 
& Cropanzano, 1996), being forgiven (or unforgiven) generates emotional reactions, which in 
turn serve as antecedents to more distal attitudes and behavioral intent.  Because the process of 
imposing punishment involves a diversity of emotions that may restrict or balance each other 




When an individual perceives her workplace to be highly forgiving, the experience of 
being personally forgiven will be perceived as normal because it is consistent with expectations 
about how co-workers deal with mistakes and failures (i.e., not dwelling on these past mistakes; 
e.g., Kahneman & Miller, 1986).  As a result, such an experience is unlikely to shape her 
punitive intent in response to workplace transgressions.  Analogously, when a disciplinary agent 
sees the organization as unforgiving, the experience of not being forgiven by a colleague will be 
perceived as consistent with expectations generated by this psychological climate.  
Consequently, being unforgiven will exert only a minor influence, if any, on the punitive 
decision-making process.   
It is when a disciplinary agent’s perceived organizational forgiveness is high that her 
experience of being unforgiven influences her punitive intent.  That is, when the disciplinary 
agent experiences being unforgiven in a workplace she views as forgiving, such an experience 
becomes salient.  This experience then triggers two emotional states that potentially make an 
individual intend to punish a transgressor more severely than she would have otherwise done.  
 The first is guilt.  Being unforgiven generates guilt, an unpleasant affective state resulting 
from having committed a transgression that one regrets and from having experienced social 
exclusion in the form of rejection by a victim (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; 
Ingersoll-Dayton & Krause, 2005; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).  Ironically perhaps, the guilt 
associated with being unforgiven is a discrete moral emotion that promotes and encourages 
responsible, normative, and moral future behavior on the part of the guilty individual (Tangney 
& Dearing, 2002; Turner & Stets, 2006).  As an emotion that is linked to one’s behavior (as 
opposed to one’s personhood or identity – the contrasting emotion of shame), guilt motivates an 




some positive action, such as confessing or making amends, or even being more compliant with 
norms and rules (e.g., Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007).  In the workplace, this means that 
individuals experiencing guilt tend to act in ways consistent and compliant with normative 
(expected) standards of behavior in their organization, which would include imposing negative 
sanctions on individuals who have committed minor acts of ethical misconduct.  Faced with a 
decision to punish an individual, unforgiven disciplinary agents would therefore be less 
susceptible to the ethical fading that high perceived organizational forgiveness may encourage in 
judging the ethicality of misconduct.  Their desire to hue to moral and normative behavior may 
lead these unforgiven agents to be more likely to make a distinction between honest mistakes and 
ethical breaches.  Consequently, even when they perceive the organization to be forgiving, these 
unforgiven disciplinary agents are likely to punish ethical misconduct more severely than agents 
who have experienced being forgiven. 
Second, empirical evidence suggests that being unforgiven also generates resentment and 
anger toward the individual refusing to forgive (Snook, 2005).  Such anger, in particular, may 
result from the unforgiven individual’s frustration at not obtaining an anticipated gratifying 
experience (Berkowitz, 1989), that is, the gratifying experience expected to follow an appeal for 
forgiveness from the victim.  In addition, anger may occur because the unforgiven individual’s 
goal of “making things right with the victim” has been blocked (Turner & Stets, 2006), in this 
case, by the unforgiving victim herself.  To the extent that such anger is repressed by an 
unforgiven disciplinary agent, it tends to be displaced and directed towards others, particularly 
those who cannot retaliate or negatively sanction back (Turner & Stets, 2006).  In other words, 
an unforgiven disciplinary agent may view the decision to punish another individual as an outlet 




However, the moderating effect of being unforgiven on the relationship between 
perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent is not symmetric with that of being 
forgiven.  When a disciplinary agent who perceives her organization to be unforgiving 
experiences being forgiven, she will also see the experience as not normal.  It will, therefore, 
become more salient that might otherwise be the case.  Being forgiven for a mistake or an 
interpersonal transgression, when one expects the opposite, can result in positive feelings such as 
a general sense of relief and gratitude toward the forgiver (Enright & The Human Development 
Study Group, 1996; Witvliet, Ludwig, & Bauer, 2002).  However, although being forgiven leads 
to such positive emotions and also reduces (or at least has a great potential to reduce) guilt 
feelings on the part of the transgressor (Murray, 2002; Reiss, 2004), empirical evidence suggests 
that it does not completely eliminate feelings of guilt (Estrada-Hollenbeck & Heatherton, 1998).  
In an organization perceived to be unforgiving, the positive inequity resulting from the 
perception that forgiveness was not completely deserved can also sustain some of these feelings 
of guilt (Baumeister et al., 1994; Kelln & Ellard, 1999).  Perceiving the organization to be 
unforgiving, a disciplinary agent who has experienced being forgiven may still experience guilt 
that will make her committed (possibly even more committed!) to normative, expected behavior 
(i.e., upholding ethical standards and punishing ethical misconduct).  Ironically, perhaps, being 
forgiven, is then likely to engender the same degree of punitive intent as the experience of being 
unforgiven, as long as the organization is perceived as unforgiving.  Confronted with the 
decision to punish an individual found guilty of ethical misconduct, a disciplinary agent who has 
experienced being forgiven may be inclined to punish an individual to the same extent as an 




Thus, disciplinary agents who perceive the workplace to be forgiving but who have 
experienced being unforgiven will tend to be more punitive than those who also perceive the 
workplace to be forgiving but have experienced being forgiven.  In addition, disciplinary agents 
who perceive the workplace to be unforgiving but who have experienced being forgiven will 
tend to be as punitive as those who also perceive the workplace to be unforgiving and have 
experienced being unforgiven.  Effectively, perceived organizational forgiveness will be 
negatively related to punitive intent when the experience salient to the agent is one in which she 
has been forgiven.  When the experience salient to the agent is one in which she has been 
unforgiven, perceived organizational forgiveness is unlikely to influence punitive intent.  In other 
words, 
Proposition 3:  A disciplinary agent’s salient transgression experience will moderate the 
relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent, such that 
perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent will be negatively related when  
the agent’s salient experience is one of being forgiven and unrelated when the agent’s 
salient experience is one of being unforgiven. 
The Ethical Misconduct 
Assuming that punishment is imposed in response to a transgression or an act of ethical 
misconduct, it is reasonable to expect that characteristics of the act of ethical misconduct itself 
are likely to influence the punitive response towards the transgressor.  Based on extant research, 
at least two dimensions of the offense itself have the potential to moderate the relationship 
between perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent: the severity of the negative 
consequences of the misconduct to the organization, and the existence of mitigating 




Severity of negative consequences.  Disciplinary agents, and individuals in general, may 
justify their punitive intent in reaction to ethical misconduct using a variety of reasons, including 
utilitarian rationales such as sending a strong signal to deter future wrongdoing and rehabilitating 
transgressors (cf. Darley & Pittman, 2003; Graham, Weiner, & Zucker, 1997).  However, 
empirical research (e.g., Carlsmith, Darley & Robinson, 2002; Darley et al., 2000) suggests that 
the severity with which individuals punish is most sensitive to factors uniquely associated with a 
“just deserts” or retributive motive (Kant, 1790/1952; Rawls, 1955); that is, punishment is a way 
to restore an imbalance in the scales of justice created by a transgression, and therefore, the 
perpetrator deserves to be negatively sanctioned in proportion to the harm done.   
Indeed, lay perceptions of the severity of organizational or “white-collar” crime are based 
on the extent of the damage done, with those resulting in physical harm to some victim (e.g., 
launching an unsafe product) rated as more severe than those resulting in financial or economic 
consequences (Meier & Short, 1983; Schrager & Short, 1980).  This is consistent with Jones’ 
(1991) ethical decision-making model, which posits that the magnitude of the consequences of 
an act or issue compels individuals to use ethical reasoning in making ethical judgments.  
Furthermore, experimental evidence does support the proposition that, at least naively, 
individuals assign punishment proportional to the magnitude of the negative consequences of the 
misconduct.  The greater the egregiousness of an offense, experimentally manipulated in terms 
of the extent to which it results in harm to some victim, the more severe the punishment 
individuals assign to a fictional transgressor (Carlsmith et al., 2002; Casey & O'Connell, 1999; 
Miller, Chino, Harney, Haines, & Saavedra, 1986; Oswald, Orth, Aeberhard, & Schneider, 
2005).  Although punitive intent may also be explained by a disciplinary agent’s sense of moral 




Pittman, 2003; Kahneman et al., 1998), meta-analytic evidence suggests that when the outcome 
of a negative incident, such as ethical misconduct, is more (as opposed to less) severe, observers 
attribute greater responsibility to the individual found guilty of the incident and perceive that 
individual to be more deserving of punishment (Robbennolt, 2000).   
Thus, the extent to which an act of ethical misconduct results in serious damage – to 
individual members of the organization, or to the organization as a whole – will potentially 
moderate the relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent in 
reaction such misconduct.  The more severe the damage resulting from an act of ethical 
misconduct, the more salient such damage becomes as a metric on the basis of which punitive 
intent is formed.  Consequently, a disciplinary agent devotes less attention to other available 
heuristics, such as her perceived organizational forgiveness, for judging the seriousness of the 
misconduct.   
In other words, disciplinary agents who perceive the workplace to be forgiving will tend 
to be more punitive when the ethical misconduct results in negative consequences that are high 
in severity than when the misconduct results in negative consequences that are low in severity.  
Disciplinary agents who perceive the workplace to be unforgiving will tend to be as punitive 
when the ethical misconduct results in negative consequences that are high in severity as when 
the misconduct results in negative consequences that are low in severity.  Effectively then, the 
negative relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent will only 
be manifest when the misconduct results in negative consequences that are low in severity.  
Conversely, when the misconduct results in negative consequences that are high in severity, the 
disciplinary agent will tend to punish severely, regardless of her perceived organizational 




Proposition 4:  The severity of the negative consequence of the ethical misconduct will 
moderate the relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive 
intent, such that perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent will be 
negatively related when the ethical misconduct results in negative consequences that are 
low in severity, and unrelated when the ethical misconduct results in negative 
consequences that are high in severity. 
Mitigating circumstances.  Aside from the negative consequences of the misconduct, 
other facts and circumstances surrounding the offense may also influence punitive reactions.  
Negative events, such as ethical misconduct, trigger attributional processes that observers and 
disciplinary agents use in judging the extent to which the transgressor was culpable for the 
offense, the extent to which the ethical misconduct was within the control of the transgressor, 
and the extent to which the offense was intentional on the part of the transgressor (cf. Weiner, 
1985).  Any evidence of mitigating circumstances, in particular, may serve as a basis for 
observers and disciplinary agents to temper responsibility attributions or blame attributions 
regarding the misconduct (see Malle, in press; Weiner, 2006).  Consequently, the degree to 
which a transgressor is perceived to be responsible and blameworthy for the ethical misconduct 
determines punitive reactions towards that transgressor (Alicke, 2000; Schlenker et al., 1994).    
Empirical evidence from the work of Weiner and colleagues (e.g., Weiner, Graham, & 
Reyna, 1997) suggests that individuals begin their punishment decision-making process with an 
inference about an individual’s responsibility for the offense.  Based on the actor-observer 
asymmetry in attribution (Jones & Nisbett, 1971), a disciplinary agent is more likely, at least 
initially, to see the ethical misconduct as resulting from factors internal to the transgressor (e.g., 




this tendency to make internal attributions might be true only under a specific set of conditions 
(Malle, 2006).  Individual differences in attributional styles (e.g., Grasmick & McGill, 1994) 
may also increase the likelihood that a disciplinary agent would attribute the misconduct to the 
transgressor’s character, leading the agent to hold the transgressor primarily responsible for the 
misconduct and consequently, to intend to punish the transgressor very severely (e.g., Cochran, 
Boots, & Heide, 2003; Young, 1991).   
Nevertheless, when asked to make attributions regarding the responsibility of a 
transgressor for acts and behaviors constituting ethical misconduct, observers and disciplinary 
agents do not just rely on these initial inferences.  Schlenker (1997) argues that they also take 
into account other available facts and details that may inform this judgment, including the 
transgressor’s autonomy and volitional control in the course of the misconduct.  Aside from 
these mostly objective and observable details surrounding the misconduct, other sources of such 
information may include accounts (such as excuses and justifications) that transgressors give to 
explain the misconduct (e.g., Scott & Lyman, 1968; Riordan, Marlin, & Kellogg, 1983). 
Based on all of this information, disciplinary agents who perceive transgressors as having 
a lesser degree of responsibility for the ethical misconduct will experience sympathy for the 
transgressor and will tend to punish less severely.  Conversely, when this additional set of 
information leads the disciplinary agent to attribute responsibility and blame primarily to the 
transgressor, the agent experiences anger towards the offender, which increases the likelihood of 
her imposing a more severe punishment in response to ethical misconduct (Greitemeyer & 
Weiner, 2006; Weiner, 2004, 2006).    
 Thus, evidence of mitigating circumstances potentially moderates the relationship 




perceived organizational forgiveness is high, she is likely to focus her attention away from 
blaming and blame attributions.  Because evidence of mitigating circumstances is essentially a 
cue suggesting reduced blameworthiness on the part of the transgressor, it is unlikely to 
constitute a central or crucial consideration in her decision-making process.  In other words,  
disciplinary agents who perceive the workplace to be forgiving will tend to be as punitive when 
there is legitimate evidence of mitigating circumstances as when there is none.  Hence, the 
influence of perceived organizational forgiveness on the disciplinary agent’s inclination to 
punish the transgressor even less severely will be minimal, if any.   
 On the other hand, when a disciplinary agent’s perceived organizational forgiveness is 
low, she is more likely to be attuned to stimuli and information that speak to blame attributions.  
To the extent that the evidence of mitigating circumstances is credible and legitimate, she is 
more likely to take such evidence into consideration in making punishment decisions.  And 
because evidence of mitigating circumstances displaces some of the responsibility for the 
misconduct to factors external to the transgressor (e.g., Schlenker, Pontari, & Christopher, 2001), 
the disciplinary agent is likely to perceive the offender not to be completely responsible for the 
misconduct.  Consequently, the severity of the punitive response decreases.  In other words, 
disciplinary agents who perceive the workplace to be unforgiving will tend to be less punitive 
when there is legitimate evidence of mitigating circumstances than when there is none. 
An important caveat is that the evidence of mitigating circumstances should be perceived 
by the disciplinary agent to be legitimate (cf. Scott & Lyman, 1968).  Attempting to blame the 
ethical misconduct on situational forces and present these as mitigating circumstances can 
backfire on a transgressor.  For instance, a study by Bellizzi and Norvell (1991) revealed that 




misconduct in a vignette did not only fail to neutralize participant punitive intent, but also 
resulted in harsher disciplinary intentions.   
To summarize, 
Proposition 5:  Evidence of mitigating circumstances will moderate the relationship 
between perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent, such that the negative 
relationship will be weaker when there is evidence of mitigating circumstances than when 
there is none.  
Summary 
 In this chapter, I have proposed that perceived organizational forgiveness, an individual 
perception of the extent to which the organization and the other organizational members are 
forgiving, shapes punitive intent in response to ethical misconduct in the workplace.  I have also 
proposed a number of moderators which either amplify or attenuate this relationship.  Figure 1 
summarizes these relationships. 
 






In proposing this model, I hope to have extended research into punishment, not only by 
incorporating the disciplinary agent’s perspective of the context into a model explaining punitive 
intent, but also by drawing attention to the boundedly rational nature of decision-making 
regarding punishment (cf. Simon, 1955).  Although disciplinary agents may engage in deliberate 
reasoning in the form of weighing available evidence of misconduct and applying formal 
disciplinary policies, I have argued that their perceptions of organizational forgiveness make 
their punishment decisions subject to other, less conscious cognitive processes such as anchoring 
and ethical fading.  Moreover, I have also explained how a number of factors involving the 
disciplinary agent and the ethical misconduct itself potentially moderate the relationship between 
perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent, again through mechanisms that may 
aptly be described as boundedly rational.  In the succeeding chapters, I present studies testing the 




CHAPTER TWO: LAB STUDY 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this experimental study is to examine whether perceived organizational 
forgiveness influences individuals to punish someone found guilty of ethical misconduct less 
severely than they otherwise might have done.  In addition, this study was designed to 
investigate whether a disciplinary agent’s accountability to an intra-organizational audience and 
the magnitude of negative consequences of the misconduct separately moderate the relationship 
between perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent.  Through an in-basket 
simulation in which I manipulated perceived organizational forgiveness, accountability, and 
severity of negative consequences, I tested propositions one, two, and four.  Consistent with 
experimental studies of punishment decision-making in social psychology (e.g., Carlsmith et al., 
2002), I operationalized punitive intent in two ways: (i) as a measure of intention to punish, and 
(ii) as a proposed sanction.  Accordingly, I tested the following pairs of hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a:  Perceived organizational forgiveness will be negatively related to 
intentions to punish in response to ethical misconduct, such that disciplinary agents who 
perceive their work organization to be forgiving will report lower levels of intention to 
punish than agents who perceive their work organization to be unforgiving. 
Hypothesis 1b:  Perceived organizational forgiveness will be negatively related to 
proposed sanctions in response to ethical misconduct, such that disciplinary agents who 
perceive their work organization to be forgiving will propose less severe sanctions than 





Hypothesis 2a:  Accountability to an intra-organizational audience will amplify the 
negative relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and intention to 
punish, such that the relationship will be stronger among disciplinary agents whose 
accountability is high rather than low. 
Hypothesis 2b:  Accountability to an intra-organizational audience will amplify the 
negative relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and proposed 
sanctions, such that the relationship will be stronger among disciplinary agents whose 
accountability is high rather than low. 
Hypothesis 3a:  The severity of the negative consequence of the ethical misconduct will 
moderate the relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and intention to 
punish, such that perceived organizational forgiveness and intention to punish will be 
negatively related when the ethical misconduct results in negative consequences that are 
low in severity, and unrelated when the ethical misconduct results in negative 
consequences that are high in severity. 
Hypothesis 3b:  The severity of the negative consequence of the ethical misconduct will 
moderate the relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and proposed 
sanctions, such that perceived organizational forgiveness and proposed sanction will be 
negatively related when the ethical misconduct results in negative consequences that are 
low in severity, and unrelated when the ethical misconduct results in negative 
consequences that are high in severity. 





Figure 2  Model for Lab Study 
Method 
Sample and Design 
One hundred seventy-three working undergraduate business students at a public 
university in the southeastern United States voluntarily participated in this in-basket study.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions of the 2 (perceived organizational 
forgiveness: high/low) x 2 (accountability: yes/no) x 2 (severity of negative consequences: 
high/low) factorial design.   All of the participants reported working at least 5 hours a week for 
an average of 28.32 hours a week (SD = 11.14), with the average company tenure being 2.68 
years (SD = 2.57).  36.5% reported that they were working full-time.  The average participant 
was 23.75 years old (SD = 3.59).  Approximately 43.4% were female and 71.1% were non-
Hispanic Caucasian (11.0% self-identified as Hispanic, 7.5% as Black, and 6.4% as Asian). 
Procedure 
After reading a cover letter providing participants an overview of the study and their 
research-related rights, they completed an in-basket exercise.  The exercise is a modified version 




engage in various behaviors, such as fraudulent financial reporting and employment 
discrimination (Brief, Dietz, Cohen, Pugh, & Vaslow, 2000; Brief, Dukerich, Brown, & Brett, 
1996).  In this exercise, participants assumed the role of an assistant manager, Chris Meyer, 
working for a fictional restaurant, JAKE’S.  Presented with a series of memos, the participants 
indicated their decisions by using the options provided.  I deemed the in-basket an appropriate 
technique for measuring the variables of interest because it allowed me to experimentally 
manipulate the context within which decisions are made and to measure behavioral intent, 
particularly punitive intent, in a way that was subtle and realistic (Brass & Oldham, 1976; 
Dukerich, Milliken, & Cowan, 1990).   
To provide participants a context within which they were tasked to make a decision 
involving punishment, I asked them to read the following vignette, based on a scenario 
developed by McMahon and Harvey (2006).  The vignette appeared as an in-basket memo from 
James Walters, JAKE’S Controller, from whom Chris Meyer expected a short report and 
recommendation regarding an act of ethical misconduct.   
As per your request, here is what I found out about Steve Atkins, our assistant in 
charge of ordering and receiving restaurant equipment and supplies, based on reliable 
information I have gathered from other employees.  In the delivery for the week ending 
July 6, 2007, Steve discovered an espresso maker that, by some mistake, was not ordered 
and did not appear on the invoice.  Steve took the espresso maker home.  Our supplier, 
Jensen Marketing, did not know about Steve’s actions until early last week.   
The full version of this memo, including the experimental manipulations discussed in the 
succeeding section, is presented as Appendix A.  I informed the participants of the opportunity to 





Perceived organizational forgiveness.  Perceived organizational forgiveness was 
manipulated through (1) the description of the fictional restaurant, JAKE’S, that participants read 
at the beginning of the in-basket, prior to reading the various memos and (2) a statement by 
another senior manager of JAKE’S, repeating or echoing the company slogan.  Participants 
randomly assigned to the high perceived organizational forgiveness condition read the following 
description of JAKE’S: 
…employees describe JAKE’S as a very forgiving workplace.  Managers and 
subordinates alike avoid blaming, finger-pointing, and dwelling on failures, past 
mistakes, and bad decisions.  In addition, people who work at JAKE’S tend to overcome 
grudges, resentment, or ill-feelings towards co-workers who may have offended them.  In 
casual conversations, JAKE’S employees suggest that if there were to be a company 
mantra, it would be “Everybody deserves a second chance around here.”    
Moreover, in an in-basket memo in which they were asked to make a decision regarding 
punishing an employee (the punishment intention being the dependent measure, explained in a 
succeeding sub-section), participants in this condition read a statement from another manager 
echoing this description of JAKE’S: “Of course, you know what people say around here: 
everyone deserves a second chance.” 
Conversely, participants assigned to the low perceived organizational forgiveness 
condition read the following description of JAKE’S: 
…employees describe JAKE’S as a very unforgiving workplace.  Managers and 
subordinates alike tend to engage in blaming and finger-pointing, and to dwell on 




to harbor grudges, resentment, or ill-feelings towards co-workers who may have offended 
them.  In casual conversations, JAKE’S employees suggest that if there were to be a 
company slogan, it would be “Zero tolerance” or “There’s no such thing as a second 
chance.” 
Analogously, in the memo in which they had to make a punishment decision, participants in this 
condition read a statement from another manager saying “Of course, you know what people say 
around here: zero tolerance.  There’s no such thing as a second chance.”   
Accountability.  Accountability to an intra-organizational audience was manipulated 
through (1) a description of the role and responsibilities of Chris Meyer, prior to reading the 
various memos and (2) a statement regarding accountability that was embedded in one of the 
memos.  As part of the introduction describing their role as Chris Meyer, participants randomly 
assigned to the high accountability condition read the following: 
…as assistant manager, you should be aware that your fellow managers as well as 
senior executives at JAKE’S corporate office will want to be informed of the decisions 
you make and the actions you take.  Thus, you should always be ready to justify these 
decisions and actions when you are called upon to do so. 
In addition, as part of the memo asking them to impose a punishment, participants in the 
accountable condition will see the following comment made by Barbara Brown, the 
administrative assistant: “Chris – I’m sure other managers and assistant managers will be 
interested to see how you deal with this case and how you will justify your decision.”   
On the other hand, participants assigned to the low accountability condition will not read any 




Severity of negative consequences.  The severity of the negative consequences of the 
ethical misconduct was manipulated through a statement made by Controller James Walters as 
part of his assessment of the repercussions of Steve’s actions with respect to JAKE’S supplier 
Jensen Marketing.  Participants randomly assigned to the high severity condition read the 
following statement embedded in Walters’ memo: “Unfortunately, based on my conversation 
with Jensen’s representative, Steve’s actions seemed to have made them seriously doubt our 
credibility as a business customer, which may likely result in more stringent and costly delivery 
processes for us.”  On the other hand, participants assigned to the low severity condition read the 
statement: “Based on my conversation with Jensen’s representative, Steve’s actions did not seem 
to have damaged our relationship with them in any way.  I don’t think the incident has any other 
serious or adverse consequences for JAKE’S as a company.” 
Dependent Measures 
I measured punitive intent by asking participants to consider an appropriate punishment 
for Steve Atkins, as part of their response to a memo from JAKE’S controller, James Walters.  I 
operationalized punitive intent in response to ethical misconduct in two ways: as intention to 
punish and as proposed sanction.  In addition, I constructed three composite measures of punitive 
intent based on these measures of intent to punish and proposed sanction. 
Intention to punish.  I measured participants’ intention to punish as the average of a 
three-item scale, with which I asked participants to indicate, on a seven-point response format (1 
= “strongly disagree,” 7 = “strongly agree”) the extent to which they agreed with each of the 
following statements: “I intend to punish Steve severely,” “I plan to impose a stiff penalty on 




measure of intention to punish had a Cronbach’s Alpha of .94, with all items loading onto a 
single factor.   
Proposed sanction.  In addition, I also asked participants to recommend an appropriate 
sanction for Steve using a nine-point response format ranging from “no suspension” (coded as 1) 
to “termination” (coded as 9).  A sample memo with both punitive intent measures is shown as 
Appendix B.    
Composite measures of punitive intent.  For purposes of conducting post-hoc analyses, 
I constructed indexes or composite measures of punitive intent.  Each of these composites is a 
weighted average of the standardized scores obtained from the three items used to measure 
intention to punish and the single item measuring proposed sanction.  One composite, which I 
refer to as Punitive Intent (A), was computed as the average of the standardized score on the 
three-item intention to punish measure and the standardized score on proposed sanction.  A 
second, Punitive Intent (B), was computed as the average of four standardized scores: three 
scores corresponding to each of the intention to punish items and the fourth corresponding to 
proposed sanction.  A third, Punitive Intent (C), was computed as the average of two 
components: (i) the average of three standardized scores, corresponding to each of the items on 
the intention to punish measure, and (ii) the standardized proposed sanction score.  All three 
composite measures were internally consistent (Cronbach’s Alpha values were .79, .92, and .79 
for the three composites, respectively).   
After completing the in-basket exercise and the other measures, I asked participants to 
self-report demographic information such as age, sex, marital status, race/ethnicity, full time/part 





After participants finished the in-basket exercise, they completed a brief questionnaire 
that contained the manipulation checks.  All the manipulation check items were scored using a 
seven-point response format (1 = “strongly disagree,” 7 = “strongly agree”).  
Perceived organizational forgiveness.  The effectiveness of the perceived 
organizational forgiveness manipulation was assessed using a three-item scale asking 
participants to rate the extent to which they thought that JAKE’S was a company were people 
“are forgiving,” “dwell on past mistakes or bad decisions,” (reverse-scored) and “tend to harbor 
grudges ” (reverse-scored).   The three items all cleanly loaded onto a single factor, and had a 
Cronbach’s Alpha of .85.  These items were embedded within a scale that included five other 
items that may be used to describe people in a company such as JAKE’S (see Appendix C).   
Accountability.  The effectiveness of the accountability manipulation was assessed with 
the item “As assistant manager, I felt that I had to be able to justify my decisions and actions to 
the other managers.” 
Severity of negative consequences.  Finally, the effectiveness of the severity of negative 
consequences manipulation was assessed by asking participants to rate the extent to which they 
felt that Steve Atkins’s action of taking home the espresso maker resulted in serious 
repercussions for JAKE’S as a company.  Two items were used for this manipulation check: 
“Steve Atkins’ action of taking the espresso maker home has serious negative consequences for 
JAKE’S” and “Steve Atkins’ action of taking the espresso maker home has grave repercussions 
for JAKE’S as a company.”  The two items were significantly correlated (r(173) = .58, p < .001) 





Table 1 provides the means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations.  Intention to 
punish was highly correlated with proposed sanction (r(173) = .65, p < .001).  As expected, the 
three composite measures were each highly correlated with intention to punish (minimum r(173)  = 
.90, p < .001), with proposed sanction (minimum r(173)  = .80, p < .001), and with each other 
(minimum r(173)  = .97, p < .001). 
Manipulation Checks 
The manipulation checks were subjected to 2 x 2 x 2 analyses of variance (ANOVAs).  
As expected, participants assigned to the high perceived organizational forgiveness condition 
viewed JAKE’S as a more forgiving organization (M = 5.79, SE = 0.09) than did those assigned 
to the low condition (M = 3.27, SE = 0.14), with F(1,165) = 216.60 (p < .001, partial η
2
 = 0.57).  In 
addition, participants assigned to the high accountability condition felt that they had to be able to 
justify their decisions and action to other managers more than those who were assigned to the  
low condition (M = 5.73, SE = 0.12 and M = 5.29, SE = 0.17, respectively; F(1,165) = 4.50, p < .05, 
partial η2 = 0.03).  Finally, as anticipated, participants assigned to the high severity of negative 
consequences condition viewed Steve Atkins’ action as resulting in severe repercussions for 
JAKE’S (M = 5.13, SE = 0.14) more than did those assigned to the low condition (M = 4.27, SE 
= 0.16), with F(1,165) = 16.38, p < .001, partial η
2
 = 0.09.  The manipulation checks indicate that 
the experimental manipulations achieved their purpose.  There were no statistically significant 




Table 1  Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Perceived Organizational Forgiveness      
    (0 = Low, 1 = High) 
0.48 0.50          
2. Accountability (0 = Low, 1 = High)
 
0.51 0.50 -0.02         
3. Severity of Negative Consequences    
    (0 = Low, 1 = High) 
0.52 0.50 0.02 0.06        
4. Age
 
23.75 3.59 0.07 0.08 -0.13       
5. Sex (1 = Male, 2 = Female) 1.43 0.50 -0.12 -0.06 -0.05 -0.08      
6. Intention to punish 4.95 1.38 -0.13 -0.04 0.18
*
 0.06 -0.08     
7. Proposed sanction 4.61 2.46 -0.20
**
 0.03 0.11 -0.07 0.04 0.65
***
    








   
























N = 173. 
*
p < .05. 
**
p < .01. 
***





I conducted a three-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) to examine the 
effects of perceived organizational forgiveness, accountability, and severity of negative  
consequences on the two dependent measures.  The results of the MANOVA are presented as 
Table 2.  There was no evidence from Box’s test to suggest that the variance-covariance matrices 
of both dependent variables were unequal across the eight cells generated by the 2 x 2 x 2 design 
(Box’s M = 18.84, F(21, 88763.42) = 0.86, p = .64); therefore, I used Wilks’ Λ to evaluate the effects. 
Table 2  Multivariate Analysis of Variance of Punitive Intent: Lab Study 
Effect Wilks’ Λ F(2,164) p partial η2 
Intercept 0.07 1180.53 .000 0.94 
POrgForg
 
0.96 3.42 .035 0.04 
Acct 0.99 0.56 .570 0.01 
NegCons
 
0.97 2.81 .063 0.03 
POrgForg x Acct 0.97 2.68 .072 0.03 
POrgForg x NegCons 0.96 3.84 .023 0.05 
Acct x NegCons 0.99 0.47 .625 0.01 
POrgForg x Acct x NegCons 1.00 0.08 .925 0.00 
Note. POrgForg = Perceived Organizational Forgiveness. Acct = Accountability.   
NegCons = Severity of Negative Consequences 
  
 
 The MANOVA results indicate a statistically significant main effect of perceived 
organizational forgiveness on the combined dependent measures of punitive intent (Wilks’ Λ = 
0.96, F(2,164) = 3.42, p < .05) as well as a statistically significant interaction of perceived 
organizational forgiveness and the severity of the negative consequences of the ethical 
misconduct (Wilks’ Λ = 0.96, F(2,164) = 3.84, p < .05).  As a follow up to these MANOVA 
results, I conducted separate analyses of variance (ANOVAs) for intention to punish and for 




Table 3  Univariate Analyses of Variance: Lab Study 
   DV = Intention to punish  DV = Proposed sanction  
Source df  MS F partial η2  MS F partial η2  
Intercept 1  4172.17 2328.79
***
 0.93  3588.72 632.38
***
 0.79  
POrgForg
 
1  4.96 2.77
+
 0.02  39.02 6.88
**
 0.04  
Acct 1  0.93 0.52 0.00  0.13 0.02 0.00  
NegCons
 
1  10.13 5.65
*
 0.03  12.43 2.19 0.01  
POrgForg x Acct 1  0.02 0.01 0.00  16.94 2.99
+
 0.02  
POrgForg x NegCons 1  13.18 7.36
**
 0.04  27.02 4.76
*
 0.03  
Acct x NegCons 1  1.69 0.94 0.01  2.57 0.45 0.00  
POrgForg x Acct x NegCons 1  0.11 0.06 0.00  0.04 0.01 0.00  
Error 165  1.79    5.68    
Total 173          
Note. POrgForg = Perceived Organizational Forgiveness. Acct = Accountability. NegCons = Severity of Negative Consequences. 
+






Evidence from the study was consistent with Hypotheses 1a and 1b.  As expected, individuals 
assigned to the high perceived organizational forgiveness condition reported the intention to 
punish Steve less severely (M = 4.76, SE = 0.15) than did those assigned to the low perceived 
organizational forgiveness condition (M = 5.10, SE = 0.14), although the effect of perceived 
organizational forgiveness on intention to punish was marginally significant (F(1,165) = 2.77, p = 
.098, partial η2 = 0.02).  Hence, there was marginal support for Hypothesis 1a, as depicted in 
Figure 3.   
 
Figure 3  Main Effect of Perceived Organizational Forgiveness on Intention to Punish 
 
 On the other hand, the effect of perceived organizational forgiveness on proposed 
sanction was statistically significant (F(1,165) = 6.88, p < .05, partial η
 2
 = 0.04), with the sanction 
proposed by individuals assigned to the high perceived organizational forgiveness condition 
being less severe,  on average (M = 4.10, SE = 0.26), than the sanction proposed by those 
assigned to the low condition (M = 5.05, SE = 0.25).  Figure 4 depicts the effect of perceived 





Figure 4  Main Effect of Perceived Organizational Forgiveness on Proposed Sanction 
 There was not sufficient evidence to support Hypotheses 2a and 2b.  Based on a two-
tailed criterion, there was no statistically significant interactive effect of perceived organizational 
forgiveness and accountability on both intention to punish (F(1,165) = 0.01, p = .91) and on 
proposed sanction (F(1,165) = 2.99, p = .086).  However, given that the pattern of the interaction 
effect on proposed sanction was in the hypothesized direction, a one-tailed significance test 
suggests that there was a statistically significant interaction effect on proposed sanction (F(1,165) = 
2.99, p < .05, one-tailed; see Figure 5).  Simple effects analysis revealed that perceived 
organizational forgiveness had a statistically significant simple effect on proposed sanction when 
accountability was high (simple effect F(1,87) = 9.03, p < .01), with participants assigned to the 
high perceived organizational forgiveness condition proposing less severe sanctions (M = 3.82, 
SE = 0.37) than did those who were assigned to the low perceived organizational forgiveness 
condition (M = 5.40, SE = 0.35).  This simple effect was not detected when accountability was 
low (M = 4.39, SE = 0.37 for high POF and M = 4.71, SE = 0.36 for low POF, simple effect 





Figure 5  Interaction Effect of Perceived Organizational Forgiveness and Accountability on 
Proposed Sanction 
 Lastly, there was a statistically significant interaction effect of perceived organizational 
forgiveness and severity of negative consequences on both intention to punish (F(1,165) = 7.36, p < 
.01, partial η2 = 0.04) and proposed sanction (F(1,165) = 4.76, p < .05, partial η
2
 = 0.03).  
However, the interaction effect was not consistent with Hypotheses 3a and 3b.  Simple effects 
analyses revealed that perceived organizational forgiveness had the anticipated effect on punitive 
intent only when the severity of the negative consequences of the ethical misconduct was high.  
Specifically, when the severity of the negative consequences of Steve’s actions was high, 
perceived organizational forgiveness had a simple effect on intention to punish (F(1,88) = 12.75, p 
< .001), such that participants assigned to the high perceived organizational forgiveness 
condition indicated less severe intentions to punish Steve (M = 4.74, SE = 0.18) than did those 
who were assigned to the low perceived organizational forgiveness condition (M = 5.62, SE = 
0.17).  On the other hand, when the severity of the negative consequences of Steve’s actions was 
low, the intention to punish reported by participants assigned to the high perceived organizational 




= 4.58, SE = 0.20 and M = 4.81, SE = 0.22, respectively, simple effect F(1,83) = 0.50, p = .482; see 
Figure 6).   
 
Figure 6  Interaction effect of Perceived Organizational Forgiveness and Severity of Negative 
Consequences on Intention to Punish 
 Similarly, perceived organizational forgiveness had a simple effect on proposed sanction 
when the severity of the negative consequences was high (F(1,88) = 13.91, p < .001), with 
participants assigned to the high perceived organizational forgiveness condition proposing less 
severe sanctions (M = 3.96, SE = 0.35) than did those who were assigned to the low perceived 
organizational forgiveness condition (M = 5.76, SE = 0.34).  When the severity of the negative 
consequences of Steve’s actions was low, the sanction proposed by participants assigned to the 
high perceived organizational forgiveness did not significantly differ from that proposed by 
participants in the low condition (M = 4.26, SE = 0.40 and M = 4.39, SE = 0.37, respectively, 





Figure 7  Interaction effect of Perceived Organizational Forgiveness and Severity of Negative 
Consequences on Proposed Sanction 
Post-hoc Analyses 
As part of my follow-up analyses, I examined the hypothesized relationships by running 
three separate univariate ANOVAs, corresponding to the three composite measures of punitive 
intent.  The results of these post-hoc analyses are summarized in Table 4. 
Across all three composite measures, there was evidence of a main effect of perceived 
organizational forgiveness, consistent with hypotheses 1a and 1b.  There was also evidence of 
the interaction effect of perceived organizational forgiveness and the severity of the negative 
consequences on each of the three composites, consistent with the patterns detected when 
intention to punish and proposed sanction were analyzed separately.  However, there was no 




Table 4  Post-hoc Univariate Analyses of Variance of Composite Measures: Lab Study 
   DV = Punitive Intent (A)  DV = Punitive Intent (B)  DV = Punitive Intent (C) 












Intercept 1  0.03 0.04 0.00  0.03 0.03 0.00  0.03 0.04 0.00 
POrgForg
 
1  4.31 5.63
*
 0.03  3.19 4.30
*
 0.03  4.15 5.72
*
 0.03 
Acct 1  0.08 0.10 0.00  0.21 0.29 0.00  0.07 0.09 0.00 
NegCons
 
1  3.49 4.57
*
 0.03  3.97 5.35
*
 0.03  3.26 4.50
*
 0.03 
POrgForg x Acct 1  0.61 0.80 0.01  0.11 0.15 0.00  0.61 0.84 0.36 
POrgForg x NegCons 1  5.62 7.35
**
 0.04  5.74 7.73
**
 0.05  5.29 7.30
**
 0.04 
Acct x NegCons 1  0.64 0.83 0.01  0.70 0.94 0.01  0.60 0.83 0.01 
POrgForg x Acct x NegCons 1  0.01 0.01 0.00  0.02 0.03 0.00  0.01 0.01 0.00 
Error 165  0.77    0.74       
Total 173             
Note. POrgForg = Perceived Organizational Forgiveness. Acct = Accountability. NegCons = Severity of Negative Consequences. 
*
p < .05. 
**
p < .01. 
***





 This study examined the influence of perceived organizational forgiveness on a 
disciplinary agent’s punitive intent in response to ethical misconduct.  The results provided 
support for this hypothesized effect, particularly when punitive intent was operationalized as 
proposed sanction.  The results suggest that in response to ethical misconduct, individuals who 
view their organizational context as forgiving tend to propose less severe sanctions than those 
who see their organization as unforgiving.  There was also evidence of this main effect when 
punitive intent was operationalized as intention to punish, although the effect became statistically 
significant only when the consequences of the unethical behavior to the organization were 
severe.  In the concluding chapter, I discuss the implication of these findings to the use of 
criterion variables in research on punishment decision-making. 
 Moreover, the results suggest the conditions that appear to attenuate the effect of 
perceived organizational forgiveness on punitive intent.  First, the data were consistent with 
expectation that the effect would be greater when the disciplinary agent had high accountability 
as opposed to low accountability.  That the effect of perceived organizational forgiveness on 
proposed sanction was only observed among agents who were assigned to the high 
accountability condition suggests that having low accountability attenuated the effect.  When 
individuals were put in a situation of low accountability, in which they presumably felt less of a 
need to justify their decisions to other organizational members, perceived organizational 
forgiveness did not have an effect on their proposed sanction.  One theoretical implication of this 
finding is that defensive bolstering (Tetlock et al., 1989), which would have potentially amplified 
the effect of perceived organizational forgiveness on punitive intent, is less likely to be the 




organizational forgiveness and punitive intent.  Instead, the attenuating effect of low 
accountability is consistent with what Kurzban, DeScioli, and O’Brien (2007) refer to as an 
audience effect of moralistic punishment. This audience effect refers to the increase in 
punishment imposed on another individual perceived to have committed a moral violation when 
the disciplinary agent anticipates that her decision will be revealed to others (e.g., an 
experimenter, an unknown third party).   
 In the context of this study, the condition of high accountability serves as a cue to the 
disciplinary agent that some third party audience is present and will know of the punishment 
decision.  This cue apparently prompts the disciplinary agent to moralistically punish in 
accordance with the audience’s expectations and preferences.  The agent estimates these 
preferences using her perceptions of organizational forgiveness.  Consequently, the agent 
imposes a severe punishment when the audience that will know of the decision is unforgiving 
and signifies a less severe punishment when that audience is forgiving.  Conversely, under low 
accountability, operationalized as the condition in which there was no indication about the need 
for the disciplinary agent to justify her decision, there was an absence of such a prompt or cue to 
punish in accordance with the audience expectations.  Hence, there was a nonsignificant effect of 
perceived organizational forgiveness in this condition.  
 Second, whereas I proposed that severe negative consequences of the unethical behavior 
would attenuate the effect of perceived organizational forgiveness on punitive intent, the data 
suggest the opposite.  The results showed the influence of perceived organizational forgiveness 
on both intention to punish and proposed sanction only when the unethical conduct being 
punished had severe negative consequences for the organization.  When the unethical behavior 




organizational forgiveness.  To the extent that disciplinary agents use their perceptions of 
organizational forgiveness as a heuristic for making punishment decisions, this finding suggests 
that disciplinary agents tend to rely more on relevant cues provided by the organizational context 
(i.e., cues on forgiveness when the decision involves punishment) when the offense is more 
serious than when it is less serious.  Punishing an offense that produced serious damage to an 
organization is a high-stakes decision, compared to punishing an offense that resulted in little 
damage to an organization.  In such high-stakes decision contexts, the desire for accuracy among 
decision makers is heightened (e.g., Kahn & Baron, 1995).  Thus, disciplinary agents seek out 
more information and maximize the use of available information, including their perceptions of 
organizational forgiveness, when punishing more serious offenses relative to when they punish 
less serious offenses. 
 Although the factorial experimental design of Study 1 allows for testing the causal effects 
of perceived organizational forgiveness and the moderating effects of accountability and the 
severity of the negative consequences of the offense, one potential limitation of this study is its 
external validity.  To what extent do disciplinary agents’ perceptions of perceived organizational 
forgiveness in their actual organizations influence their punishment decision making?  This is the 




CHAPTER THREE: FIELD STUDY 
Purpose of the Study 
Similar to Study 1, the purpose of this study is to examine the hypothesized negative 
relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent in response to 
ethical misconduct.  In addition, this study also aims to investigate the moderating effects of a 
disciplinary agent’s salient transgression experience and the presence of mitigating 
circumstances surrounding the ethical misconduct.  Through a field experiment in which I 
measured perceived organizational forgiveness and manipulated both the participant’s salient 
transgression experience and the presence of mitigating circumstances in a vignette depicting 
ethical misconduct, I tested Propositions 1, 3, and 5, as indicated in Chapter One.  Consistent 
with the lab study and with experimental studies of punishment decision-making in social 
psychology (e.g., Carlsmith et al., 2002), I again operationalized punitive intent in two ways: (i) 
as a measure of intention to punish, and (ii) as a proposed sanction.  Accordingly, I tested the 
following pairs of hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a:  Perceived organizational forgiveness will be negatively related to 
intentions to punish in response to ethical misconduct. 
Hypothesis 1b:  Perceived organizational forgiveness will be negatively related to 
proposed sanctions in response to ethical misconduct. 
Hypothesis 2a:  A disciplinary agent’s salient transgression experience will moderate the 
relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and intention to punish, such 




related when the agent’s salient experience is one of being forgiven and unrelated when 
the agent’s salient experience is one of being unforgiven. 
Hypothesis 2b:  A disciplinary agent’s salient transgression experience will moderate the 
relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and proposed sanction, such 
that perceived organizational forgiveness and proposed sanction will be negatively 
related when the agent’s salient experience is one of being forgiven and unrelated when 
the agent’s salient experience is one of being unforgiven. 
Hypothesis 3a:  Evidence of mitigating circumstances will moderate the relationship 
between perceived organizational forgiveness and intention to punish, such that the 
negative relationship will be weaker when there is evidence of mitigating circumstances 
than when there is none.  
Hypothesis 3b:  Evidence of mitigating circumstances will moderate the relationship 
between perceived organizational forgiveness and proposed sanction, such that the 
negative relationship will be weaker when there is evidence of mitigating circumstances 
than when there is none.  
A diagram of the hypotheses being tested is presented in Figure 8.  
 





Sample and Design 
Two hundred nineteen working undergraduate business students at a public university in 
the southeastern United States voluntarily participated in this field study in which perceived 
organizational forgiveness was measured, as opposed to manipulated.  Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of four conditions of the 2 (salient transgression experience: 
unforgiven/forgiven) x 2 (mitigating circumstances: present/absent) factorial design.   Fifty-two 
participants (23.74%) did not respond substantively to the salient transgression experience 
manipulation or failed to complete both dependent measures (e.g., did not write anything on the 
space provided, or indicated that the situation was not applicable to them) and were excluded 
from the final sample.  All of the 167 participants in the final sample reported working at least 9 
hours a week for an average of 28.82 hours a week (SD = 10.67), with the average company 
tenure being 2.58 years (SD = 2.68).  With the final sample, 38.3% reported that they were 
working full-time.  The average participant was 24.05 years old (SD = 4.15).  Approximately 
43.7% were female and 61.1% were non-Hispanic Caucasian (18.0% self-identified as Hispanic, 
9.0% as Asian, and 7.2% as Black). 
Procedure 
After reading a cover letter providing them an overview of the study and their research-
related rights, participants were asked to complete several tasks as part of the field survey.  I 
asked them to recall and summarize a work-related experience in which they were either 
forgiven or not forgiven for a transgression they had committed. I then provided them a context 
within which they were to indicate their punitive intent in response to ethical misconduct.  




to signify their punitive intent.  I patterned the vignette after that embedded in the lab study in-
basket, based on a scenario developed by McMahon and Harvey (2006): 
Imagine that you are a manager of your current work organization. Working for 
you is Steve Atkins, an administrative assistant in charge of ordering equipment 
and supplies.  Based on credible information that you gathered from other 
employees, Steve discovered an espresso maker in a delivery he received around 
three months ago.  Your company did not order the espresso maker, and it did not 
appear on the invoice.  Steve took it home without informing the supplier and the 
delivery person about it, and has since sold it online.
 1
   
Finally, I asked the participants to complete other measures, including a scale measuring 
perceived organizational forgiveness.  As with the lab study, I offered participants the 
opportunity to be debriefed regarding the purpose and nature of the study, after all participants 
had completed the survey.   
Experimental Manipulations 
Salient transgression experience.  The experience of being unforgiven (versus forgiven) 
was manipulated through an incident-recall exercise typical of the methodological paradigm used 
to study transgression-specific forgiveness and forgiveness interventions (McCullough & 
Worthington, 1999).  Participants randomly assigned to the [un]forgiven condition read the 
following instructions, with elements adapted from similar recall exercises (e.g., Baumeister, 
Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990; Freedman & Enright, 1996; McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 
1997; Miller, 1992; Zechmeister & Romero, 2002): 
                                                 
1
 Based on a pilot test that included individuals working full-time in non-restaurant settings (N = 24), there was no 




Nearly everyone has, at some point, treated a co-worker, subordinate, or boss in 
such a way that may have hurt or offended them.  It may have been unintentional or 
intentional.  But it may have led to a sense of injustice, of being hurt, or a betrayal of trust 
on the part of the other person.  Spend a few moments to recall a work-related incident in 
which you were [not] forgiven by someone whom you may have hurt or offended.  
Visualize in your mind what that person said in deciding [not] to forgive you, and how 
you felt during that moment.  In the spaces provided below, write a 3-5 sentence 
summary of the incident.  Whenever possible, describe your experience in detail, but feel 
free to withhold identifying information (e.g., names, places, company, dates) in writing 
your summary. 
Mitigating circumstances.  The existence of mitigating circumstances surrounding Steve 
Atkins’ ethical misconduct was manipulated by providing additional information regarding his 
reasons for taking home the espresso maker and selling it online.  In the condition in which 
evidence of mitigating circumstances was present, participants read the following additional 
sentences:  
When you talked with Steve about his actions, he explained that he took the 
espresso maker and sold it online because he needed the money to pay for the medical 
bills of his wife, who is sick of cancer.  You have verified from other employees that 
indeed, he was having a hard time making ends meet since his wife got sick. 
On the other hand, participants assigned to the condition in which evidence of mitigating 
circumstances was absent read the following information: 
When you talked with Steve about his actions, he explained that he took the 




bills.  You have verified from other employees that indeed, he was having a hard time 
making ends meet because of his credit card debt. 
Independent Variables and Potential Covariates 
Perceived organizational forgiveness.  To assess the participant’s perceived 
organizational forgiveness of his or her current workplace, I used the three-item measure of 
organizational forgiveness developed by Cameron et al. (2004).  On a seven-point response 
format (1 = “to a small extent,” 7 = “to a large extent”), I asked participants to rate the extent to 
which they think the following statements are true of their current work organization: “We try to 
learn from our mistakes here; consequently, missteps are quickly forgiven,” “This is a forgiving, 
compassionate organization in which to work,” and “We have very high standards of 
performance, yet we forgive mistakes when they are acknowledged and corrected.”  Based on a 
principal components analysis, all three items loaded on a single factor and had a Cronbach’s 
Alpha of .79.   
Social desirability.  As a potential covariate, I measured each participant’s propensity to 
respond in socially desirable ways initially using revised Form X1, a seven-item subset of 
Crowne and Marlowe’s (1960) Social Desirability Scale that Fischer and Fick (1993, p. 423) 
described as one of the two subscales that was “superior to all of the other scales,” having 
“acceptable internal consistency.”  The seven items loaded onto two factors, based on a principal 
components analysis.  Three items loaded onto a single factor but had extremely low internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s Alpha = .39).   The other four-item subset, which consisted of items that 
were all reverse-scored, cleanly loaded onto a second factor, with a modest internal consistency 
of .62.  I used the average rating from these four items (“I sometimes feel resentful when I don’t 




I knew they were right,” “There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of 
others,” and “I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me”) as a measure of social 
desirability.  The items used a five-point response format (1 = “to a small extent,” 5 = “to a large 
extent”).   
Perceived Unethicality of Steve’s Actions.  As a covariate potentially useful for a post-
hoc analysis of the mechanisms underlying the relationship between perceived organizational 
forgiveness and punitive intent, I also assessed the participants’ ethical tolerance by measuring 
their perceptions of the extent to which Steve’s actions were unethical.  After participants had 
read the vignette and before they indicated their intention to punish and their proposed sanction, I 
asked them to rate on a seven-point response format (1 = “to a small extent,” 7 = “to a large 
extent”), the extent to which they agreed with following statements: “What Steve did was a 
major breach of ethical standards,” and “Steve’s actions constitute grave misconduct.”  Because 
the two items were highly correlated (r = .69, p < .001), I took their average as a measure of 
perceived unethicality of Steve’s actions.  Cronbach’s Alpha for this two-item measure was .82. 
Tendency to Forgive.  As another potential covariate that may account for variance in 
punishment intentions, I also assessed the participants’ dispositional tendency to forgive.  I 
measured this tendency to forgive using Brown’s four-item (2003) scale, with which participants 
rated on a seven-point response format (1 = “almost always false of me,” 7 = “almost always true 
of me”) the extent to which thought statements about forgiving were true of themselves.  Sample 
items were “I tend to get over it quickly when someone hurts my feelings” and “I have a 






Demographic variables.  After completing the in-basket and other measures, I asked 
participants to self-report demographic information such as age, sex, marital status, 
race/ethnicity, full time/part time work status, number of hours they work each week, and tenure 
in their current company. 
Dependent Measures 
I measured punitive intent by asking participants to consider an appropriate punishment 
for Steve Atkins.  As I did with the lab study, I operationalized punitive intent in response to a 
transgression in two ways: as intention to punish and as proposed sanction.  As I did in the lab 
study, I constructed three composite measures or indexes of punitive intent based on these 
measures of intent to punish and proposed sanction, for purposes of conducting post-hoc 
analyses. 
Intention to punish.  I measured participants’ intention to punish as the average of a 
three-item scale, with which I asked them to indicate, on a seven-point response format (1 = 
“strongly disagree,” 7 = “strongly agree”) the extent to which they agreed with each of the 
following statements: “If I were Steve’s manager, I would punish him severely,” “If I were 
Steve’s manager, I would impose a stiff penalty on him for his actions,” and “If Steve were my 
subordinate, I would enforce serious negative sanctions on him.”  This measure of intention to 
punish had a Cronbach’s Alpha of .88, with all items loading onto a single factor.   
Proposed sanction.  In addition, I asked participants to recommend an appropriate 
sanction for Steve using a nine-point response format ranging from “no suspension” (coded as 1) 
to “termination” (coded as 9).   
Composite measures of punitive intent.  Analogous to what I did in the lab study, I 




scores obtained from the three items used to measure intention to punish and the single item 
measuring proposed sanction.  The first, Punitive Intent (A), was computed as the average of the 
standardized score on the three-item intention to punish measure and the standardized score on 
proposed sanction.  Punitive Intent (B), the second, was computed as the average of four 
standardized scores: three scores corresponding to each of the intention to punish items and the 
fourth corresponding to proposed sanction.  The third, Punitive Intent (C), was computed as the 
average of two components: (i) the average of three standardized scores, corresponding to each 
of the items on the intention to punish measure, and (ii) the standardized proposed sanction 
score.  All three composite measures were internally consistent (Cronbach’s Alpha values were 
.73, .87, and .74 for the three composites, respectively).   
Manipulation Checks 
Salient transgression experience.  The effectiveness of the salient transgression 
experience manipulation was assessed by asking participants to rate the extent to which the word 
“unforgiven” describes them at that moment, using a five-point response format (1 = “very 
slightly or not at all,” 5 = “extremely”).  This single-item manipulation check was embedded 
within the twenty-item Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988) and was administered immediately following the incident-recall manipulation.   
Mitigating circumstances.  To assess the effectiveness of the mitigating circumstances 
manipulation, I asked participants to rate the extent to which they felt that there were 
circumstances that attenuated Steve Atkins’ responsibility for what he did, using a seven-point 
response format (1 = “strongly disagree,” 7 = “strongly agree”).  Two items were used for this 
manipulation check: “There are aspects of Steve’s circumstances that make him less 




selling it online makes him less culpable for his actions.”  The two items were significantly 
correlated, r(167) = .43, p< .001 and had an internal consistency of .61.  Given that both sentences 
were stated in terms of less responsibility on the part of Steve, higher average scores on these 
two items reflect perceptions of a lower degree of culpability on Steve’s part. 
Results 
Table 5 provides the means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations.  As with 
Study 1, intention to punish was highly correlated with proposed sanction (r(167) = .58, p < .001).  
Age was significantly correlated with both intention to punish (r(167) = .20, p < .01) and proposed 
sanction (r(167) = .24, p < .01).  Sex was significantly correlated with proposed sanction (r(167) = 
.16, p < .05), with women proposing more severe sanctions than men (M = 4.64, SE = 0.34 and 
M = 3.80, SE = 0.24, respectively, with t165 = 2.08, p < .05). As expected, the three composite 
measures were each also highly correlated with intention to punish (minimum r(167)  = .88, p < 
.001), with proposed sanction (minimum r(167)  = .76, p < .001), and with each other (minimum 
r(173)  = .97, p < .001).  Social desirability was not significantly correlated with any of the 




Table 5  Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations: Field Study Variables 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Perceived Organizational Forgiveness      5.21 1.23             
2. Salient transgression experience  
    (-1 = Forgiven, 1 = Unforgiven)
 -0.01 1.00 -0.08 
           
3. Mitigating Circumstances 
    (-1 = Absent, 1 = Present) 0.01 1.00 -0.02 -0.04 
          
4. Age
 24.03 4.15 0.00 0.08 0.02          
5. Sex (1 = male, 2 = female) 1.44 0.50 0.09 0.07 0.03 0.08         
6. Social Desirability 3.43 0.75 -0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.07 0.14        
7. Intention to punish 4.75 1.54 0.10 0.03 -0.39
*** 0.20** 0.06 0.14       
8. Proposed Sanction 4.17 2.64 0.05 0.01 -0.17
* 0.24** 0.16* 0.14 0.58***      
9. Punitive Intent (A) 0.00 0.89 0.09 0.02 -0.32
*** 0.25** 0.12 0.16* 0.89*** 0.89***     
10. Punitive Intent (B) 0.01 0.85 0.10 0.02 -0.37
*** 0.23** 0.10 0.15 0.97*** 0.76*** 0.97***    
11. Punitive Intent (C) 0.00 0.85 0.09 0.02 -0.32
*** 0.25** 0.13 0.15 0.88*** 0.90*** 1.00*** 0.97***   
12. Perceived Unethicality of Offense 5.75 1.31 0.12 0.02 -0.30
*** 0.15 0.18* 0.15 0.71*** 0.44*** 0.65*** 0.70*** 0.64***  
13.  Tendency to Forgive 4.14 1.16 0.08 -0.03 -0.10 0.01 -0.09 0.37
*** 0.08 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.07 






The manipulation checks were subjected to 2 x 2 analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) in 
order to control for the positive correlation between age and the manipulation check for the 
salient transgression experience (r = .16, p < .05) and for the possible spillover effect of one 
manipulation on the manipulation check measure of the other variable.  As expected, participants 
assigned to the unforgiven experience condition reported feeling more unforgiven (M = 1.63, SE 
= 0.11) than did those assigned to the forgiven condition (M = 1.35, SE = 0.09), with F(1,161) = 
3.55 (one-tailed p = .03, partial η2 = 0.02).  In addition, participants assigned to the mitigating 
circumstances present condition saw Steve Atkins as less culpable or blameworthy for his 
actions (M = 3.60, SE = 0.16) than did those assigned to the absent condition (M = 2.34, SE = 
0.13), with F(1,163) = 36.72, p < .001, partial η
2
 = 0.19.  There were no statistically significant 
cross-over effects of the two-way interaction between salient experience and mitigating 
circumstances on any of these manipulation checks. 
Analysis 
I conducted two separate moderated multiple regressions to examine the effects of 
perceived organizational forgiveness, salient transgression experience, and mitigating 
circumstances on each of the dependent measures.  Because cumulative empirical evidence 
suggests that age and sex predict ethical cognition (e.g., Borkowski & Ugras, 1998; O’Fallon and 
Butterfield, 2005), I included age and sex as controls in regression analyses whenever they 
systematically accounted for significant variation in each of the dependent measures.  Thus, 
because age was significantly correlated with both intention to punish and proposed sanction, I 
included age as a control in both regression analyses.  Moreover, given that sex was significantly 




proposed sanction.  In addition, I mean-centered perceived organizational forgiveness and 
centered the dichotomous independent variables, salient transgression experience and mitigating 
circumstances, around zero.  
I entered the relevant control variables in the regression equation in step 1.  Perceived 
organizational forgiveness, salient transgression experience, and mitigating circumstances were 
then entered as predictor variables in step 2.  Two-way and three-way interaction terms were 
then entered as predictors in steps 3 and 4.  Although I did not hypothesize a three-way 
interaction among the independent variables, I included a three-way interaction term in the final 
regression models because    Table 6 shows the moderated multiple regression results for both 




Table 6  Moderated Multiple Regression Analyses: Field Study 
 
 DV = Intention to Punish  DV = Proposed Sanction 
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(0.09) 




** 10.30*** 7.62*** 7.66***  6.65** 3.98** 3.37** 3.09** 
Adj R
2




** 0.16*** 0.05* 0.03*  0.08** 0.04 0.04 0.01 
Note. POrgForg = Perceived Organizational Forgiveness. SalientExp = Salient Transgression Experience.  Mit = Mitigating Circumstances. 





There was a non-significant positive relationship between perceived organizational 
forgiveness and intention to punish (r(167) = .10, p = .20; β = .11, p = .13).  Thus, hypothesis 1a 
was not supported.  There was also a non-significant positive relationship between perceived 
organizational forgiveness and proposed sanction (r(167) = .05, p = .49; β = .03, p = .68).  Thus, 
hypothesis 1b was not supported.   
To determine whether evidence from the study was consistent with Hypothesis 2a, I 
examined the statistically significant effect of the interaction of perceived organizational 
forgiveness and salient transgression experience on intention to punish (β = .19, t = 2.72, p < .01) 
in light of the significant three-way interaction with mitigating circumstances (β = .18, p < .05; Δ 
R
2
 = .03, ΔF(1,158) = 6.13, p < .05; cf. Aiken & West, 1991).  Perceived organizational 
forgiveness and salient transgression experience did have a significant interaction effect on 
intention to punish for participants assigned to the present mitigating circumstances condition (β 
= .37, t = 3.57, p < .01; see Figure 9), but not for those assigned to the absent mitigating 
circumstances condition (β = .01, t = 0.11, p = .91; see Figure 10).  Consistent with hypothesis 
2a, there was a statistically significant negative relationship between perceived organizational 
forgiveness and intention to punish (simple slope = -0.38, t = -2.47, p < .05) among participants 
assigned to the forgiven salient transgression experience condition.  However, contrary to 
hypothesis 2a, there was also evidence of a statistically significant positive relationship between 
perceived organizational forgiveness and intention to punish (simple slope = 0.63, t = 3.83, p < 
.001) among participants for whom an unforgiven transgression experience was salient.  Thus, 






Figure 9  Interaction Effect of Perceived Organizational Forgiveness and Salient Transgression 




Figure 10  Interaction Effect of Perceived Organizational Forgiveness and Salient Transgression 
Experience on Intention to Punish (Mitigating Circumstances Absent Condition 
 
There was no three-way interaction among perceived organizational forgiveness, salient 
transgression experience, and mitigating circumstances, when the dependent measure was 




organizational forgiveness and salient transgression experience on proposed sanction (β = .17, t = 
2.20, p < .05; see Figure 11).  Consistent with hypothesis 2b, there was a negative, albeit non-
significant, relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and proposed sanction 
among participants assigned to recall a transgression experience in which they were forgiven 
(simple slope = -0.28, t = -1.14, p = .26).  However, contrary to hypothesis 2b, there was 
evidence of a statistically significant positive relationship between perceived organizational 
forgiveness and proposed sanction among participants for whom an unforgiven transgression 
experience was salient (simple slope = 0.47, t = 2.06, p < .05).  Thus, hypothesis 2b was not 
supported. 
 
Figure 11  Interaction Effect of Perceived Organizational Forgiveness and Salient Transgression 
Experience on Proposed Sanction 
Finally, although there was a main effect of mitigating circumstances on intention to 
punish (β = -.37, t = -5.41, p < .001) such that participants who read that Steve’ Atkins needed to 
pay for his wife’s medical bills indicated less severe punishment intentions than those who read 
that Steve did what he did to pay for his credit cards (M = 4.15, SE = 0.17 and M = 5.34, SE = 




circumstances was not statistically significant (β = -.01, t = -0.21, p = .84).  Thus, hypothesis 3a 
was not supported.  Analogously, although participants who read the vignette with mitigating 
circumstances present tended to propose a significantly less severe sanction than those who read 
the version where mitigating circumstances were absent (M = 3.71, SE = 0.28 and M = 4.63, SE 
= 0.29, respectively; β = -.17, t = -2.31, p < .05), there was no statistically significant interaction 
effect of perceived organizational forgiveness and mitigating circumstances on proposed 
sanction (β = .02, t = 0.25, p = .81).  Hypothesis 3b was not supported. 
Post-hoc Analysis 
As part of my follow-up analyses, I examined the hypothesized relationships by running 
three separate moderated multiple regressions, corresponding to the three composite measures of 
punitive intent.  The results of these post-hoc analyses are summarized in Tables 7 and 8. 
Across all three composite measures, the pattern of effects was consistent with those 
detected when intention to punish and proposed sanction were analyzed separately.  There was a 
main effect of mitigating circumstances and an interaction effect of perceived organizational 
forgiveness and salient transgression experience on each of the composite measures.  The effect 
of the three-way interaction among the predictors was significant only for Punitive Intent (B).  
Given that this was the composite measure with which the intention to punish items received an 
aggregate weighting three times that of the proposed sanction item, this finding is not surprising 




Table 7  Post-hoc Moderated Multiple Regression Analyses: Field Study 
 DV = Punitive Intent (A)  DV = Punitive Intent (B) 
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** 7.61*** 6.02*** 5.74***  9.38** 10.34*** 7.59*** 7.52*** 
Adj R
2




** 0.11*** 0.04* 0.01  0.05** 0.15*** 0.05* 0.03* 
Note. POrgForg = Perceived Organizational Forgiveness. SalientExp = Salient Transgression Experience.  Mit = Mitigating Circumstances. 





Table 8  Additional Post-hoc Moderated Multiple Regression Analysis: Field Study 
 DV = Punitive Intent (C) 
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(0.05) 
0.14 
         
F 10.69
** 8.32*** 6.17*** 5.94*** 
Adj R
2




** 0.11*** 0.04* 0.02 
Note. POrgForg = Perceived Organizational Forgiveness. SalientExp = Salient Transgression 
Experience.  Mit = Mitigating Circumstances.   
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
To explore the potential mechanisms underlying the effect of the interaction between 
perceived organizational forgiveness and salient transgression experience on punitive intent, I 
first examined the relationships between these predictors and the affective states of guilt and 
anger (i.e., hostility), which the participants self-reported when they completed the PANAS as 
part of the manipulation check.  Neither guilt nor anger was correlated with perceived 
organizational forgiveness, salient transgression experience, or the interaction between the two 




Next, I examined how a disciplinary agent’s ethical tolerance, operationalized as the 
agent’s perception of the unethicality of Steve’s offense, serves as a mechanism explaining the 
interaction effect of perceived organizational forgiveness and salient transgression experience on 
punitive intent.  Among those assigned to the mitigating circumstances present condition, I found 
the correlation between the interaction of perceived organizational forgiveness and salient 
transgression experience (i.e., the product term) and perception of unethicality of Steve’s offense 
to be statistically significant (r(85) = .36, p < .01).  In addition, the correlations between this 
perception of unethicality and each of the dependent measures were also statistically significant.  
The correlation between perceived unethicality and intention to punish was r(85) = .67 (p < .001) 
and the correlation between perceived unethicality and proposed sanction was r(85) = .47 (p < 
.001).  Given these relationships, I conducted a mediated moderation analysis using methods 
suggested by Edwards and Lambert (2007).  Because the correlation between the interaction of 
perceived organizational forgiveness and salient transgression experience and the disciplinary 
agent’s perceptions of unethicality of Steve’s actions was not statistically significant among 
participants assigned to the mitigating circumstances absent condition (r(83) = .05, p = .69), I 
confined my post-hoc mediated moderation analysis of intention to punish to those assigned to 
the mitigating circumstances present condition.   
The results of the mediated moderation analyses for intention to punish are summarized 
in Table 9, with the simple effects at each of the levels of the salient transgression experience 




Table 9  Mediated Moderation Regression Analyses: DV = Intention to Punish 
  DV = Perceived 
Unethicality 
 DV = Intention to 
Punish 
Predictor  Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
Age      0.06 
Sex   0.88
**
    
POrgForg  0.10 0.04  0.03 0.03 
SalientExp  -0.02 -0.02    
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N = 85, corresponding to participants assigned to the Mitigating Circumstances present 
condition.  Numbers are unstandardized regression coefficients.   
*
p < .05. 
**
p < .01. 
***
p < .001. 
  











 First Second  Direct Indirect Total 













  0.03 -0.23
*
 -0.20 
N = 85, corresponding to participants assigned to the Mitigating Circumstances present condition. Effects 
were computed based on unstandardized regression coefficients.   
*
p < .05. 
**
p < .01 
 
Consistent with the moderated multiple regression analysis of intention to punish, perceived 
organizational forgiveness and salient transgression experience exhibited a statistically 
significant interaction effect on the disciplinary agent’s perception of the unethicality of Steve’s 
action (b = 0.41, p < .001, Model 1) when mitigating circumstances surrounding Steve Atkins’ 
action were present.  This was true even controlling for the effect of sex on perceived 
unethicality (b = 0.46, p < .001, Model 2).  The simple effects analysis summarized in Table 10 
suggest that when an experience of being unforgiven in the workplace was salient to the 




Steve’s action were positively related (simple effect = 0.51, p < .01).  On the other hand, they 
were negatively related when an experience of being forgiven was the one that was salient to the 
agent (simple effect = -0.32, p < .05).  In turn, the higher the perceived unethicality of Steve’s 
action, the more severe the agent’s intention to punish (simple effect = 0.73, p.< .001, Model 3).  
The indirect effect of perceived organizational forgiveness on intention to punish, mediated by 
the agent’s perceived unethicality of Steve’s action, was positive when the experience salient to 
the agent was one of being unforgiven (indirect effect = 0.37, p < .01).  It was negative when the 
salient experience was one of being forgiven (indirect effect = -0.23, p < .05).  Figure 12 
illustrates these mediated relationships for the unforgiven and the forgiven groups.  
 
 
Figure 12  Mediated Models Showing Simple Effects for Unforgiven (Panel A) and Forgiven 
(Panel B) Participants (DV = Intention to Punish) 
 
There was evidence of a similar mediated moderation pattern when punitive intent was 
operationalized as proposed sanction.  Table 11 summarizes the results.  Table 12 shows the 
corresponding simple effects at each of the levels of the salient transgression experience 




Table 11  Mediated Moderation Regression Analyses: DV = Proposed Sanction 
  DV = Perceived 
Unethicality 
 DV = Proposed 
Sanction 
Predictor  Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
Age      0.11
***
 
Sex   0.53
**
   0.40 
POrgForg  0.12 0.09  0.00 -0.00 
SalientExp  0.04 0.03    




    





       
Adj R
2










N = 167. Numbers are unstandardized regression coefficients.  
*
p < .05. 
**
p < .01. 
***
p < .001. 
 











 First Second  Direct Indirect Total 









  Forgiven  -0.14 0.88
**
  0.00 -0.12 -0.12 
N = 167. Effects were computed based on unstandardized regression coefficients.  
*
p < .05. 
**
p < .01. 
  
Perceived organizational forgiveness and salient transgression experience exhibited a statistically 
significant effect on the disciplinary agent’s perception of the unethicality of Steve’s action (b = 
0.26, p < .01), which, in turn, was positively related to the severity of the sanction proposed by 
the agent (b = 0.88, p < .001).  This time, the indirect effect of the interaction of perceived 
organizational forgiveness and salient transgression experience on proposed sanction, mediated 
by the agent’s perceived unethicality of Steve’s action, was statistically significant when the 
experience salient to the agent was one of being unforgiven (indirect effect = 0.33, p < .01) but 
nonsignificant when the salient experience was one of being forgiven (indirect effect = -0.12, 






Figure 13  Mediated Models Showing Simple Effects for Unforgiven (Panel A) and Forgiven 
(Panel B) participants (DV = Proposed Sanction) 
Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between perceived 
organizational forgiveness and punitive intent, drawing on participants’ perceptions of and 
experience of forgiveness in actual organizational settings.  There was no evidence of the 
hypothesized main effect of perceived organizational forgiveness on punitive intent, 
operationalized either as intention to punish or proposed sanction.  That said, the results of the 
study suggest the conditions under which perceived organizational forgiveness is related (or 
unrelated) to punishment intentions.   
First, there was evidence of the hypothesized negative relationship between perceived 
organizational forgiveness and the measure of intention to punish.  More importantly, that 
relationship was evident when the transgression experience salient to the disciplinary agent was 
one in which she herself was forgiven and when there were mitigating circumstances 




unethical behavior were absent, perceived organizational forgiveness and intention to punish 
were not related.  The observed main effect of mitigating circumstances suggests that 
participants who had no information that would mitigate an offender’s responsibility for an 
unethical act tended to indicate higher levels of punitive intent than those who are made aware of 
mitigating circumstances.   
One way of interpreting these results, taken together, is that perceived organizational 
forgiveness serves as a heuristic that anchors intentions to punish only when the disciplinary 
agent has experienced being forgiven and information that potentially diminishes attributions of 
responsibility to the offender are present.  In the absence of such information, a disciplinary 
agent apparently attributes responsibility for the unethical act solely to the offender, making a 
heuristic such as perceived organizational forgiveness less salient and critical with respect to her 
intention to punish.   
The finding that seems to be more robust is the positive relationship between perceived 
organizational forgiveness and punitive intent when the transgression experience salient to the 
disciplinary agent was one of being unforgiven, as opposed to being forgiven.  Disciplinary 
agents for whom an experience of being unforgiven was salient seemed to be more punitive the 
more they saw their organizational context as forgiving, and less punitive the more they saw their 
organizational context as unforgiving.  Apparently, it is when an experience of not being 
forgiven in a forgiving organizational context is salient to disciplinary agents that they increase 
their desire to punish and propose more severe sanctions in response to ethical misconduct.  This 
is a counterintuitive relationship that deserves closer study.   
The post-hoc analyses discount the roles that guilt and anger play as potential 




forgiveness and salient transgression experience on punitive intent.  Instead, these post-hoc 
analyses suggest that the combination of the experience of being denied forgiveness and the 
perception of a forgiving organizational context heightens a disciplinary agent’s ethical 
intolerance (i.e., increases her perception that an ethical misconduct is serious).  In turn, this high 
level of ethical intolerance prompts the agent to be more punitive in response to ethical 
misconduct, both in terms of the agent’s intention to punish and proposed sanction.   
One possible explanation for this is that individuals who remember being unforgiven in a 
forgiving organization experience a form of contextual dissonance, a discrepancy between an 
individual’s social characteristics or experience and those of the people who surround her or him  
(cf. Rosenberg 1962, 1977).  A disciplinary agent with this dissonant experience (i.e., being 
unforgiven in a forgiving organizational context) may tend to make that agent more sensitive to 
distinctions between what is “good” and what is “bad.”  Faced with the task of making a 
judgment about ethical misconduct, such individuals apparently tend to compensate for the past 
damage for which they were unforgiven, by hewing to behavior that is normative and “moral.”  
In doing so, the individual seems to develop an intolerance for unethical behavior, which 
translates into higher levels of intention to punish and more severe proposed sanctions in 
response to ethical misconduct.   
In summary, data from this field study suggested a more nuanced relationship between 
perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent.  In the final chapter, I discuss how one 
might reconcile the seemingly contradictory findings from this study with those from the lab 




CHAPTER FOUR: OVERALL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The overarching purpose of this dissertation was to extend research into punishment by 
examining the influence of contextual factors in shaping punishment decisions.  Specifically, I 
investigated the relationship between a disciplinary agent’s perceived organizational forgiveness 
and punitive intent in response to ethical misconduct.  Evidence from the two empirical studies I 
reported suggests that the extent to which a disciplinary agent sees her organization as forgiving 
accounts for that person’s decision to punish unethical behavior.  Data from the lab study suggest 
that the sanctions proposed by decision-makers who perceived the organizational context as 
forgiving were less severe than those proposed by disciplinary agents who saw the organizational 
context as unforgiving.  In addition, evidence from the experiment suggests that the effect of 
perceived organizational forgiveness on punitive intent is attenuated when the agent is less 
accountable to other organizational members and when the ethical misconduct results in less 
severe negative consequences to the organization.   
On the other hand, evidence from the field study suggests that the hypothesized negative 
relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent holds only under 
certain conditions.   More precisely, disciplinary agents who perceive their organization as 
forgiving tend to indicate lower levels of intention to punish than those who see their 
organization as less forgiving, when two conditions hold: (a) when an experience of being 
forgiven is salient to them, and (b) when there are mitigating or extenuating circumstances 
surrounding the ethical misconduct.  Surprisingly, the evidence suggests that under other 
conditions, the relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent 




forgiving tend to indicate higher levels of intention to punish and propose more severe sanctions 
than those who see their organization as less forgiving, when an experience of being unforgiven 
is salient to them.   
One way to reconcile these two seemingly inconsistent sets of findings is to take into 
account the distributional nonequivalence
2
 of perceived organizational forgiveness across the 
two studies (cf. Cooper & Richardson, 1986).  In the lab study, the negative relationship between 
perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent was observed over two “extreme” levels 
of perceived organizational forgiveness: high (“forgiving”) and low (“unforgiving”).  In the field 
study, the non-negative relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive 
intent was observed, for the most part, over a narrower range of levels, mostly in the upper half 
of the perceived organizational forgiveness scale (i.e., M = 5.21, SD = 1.23).  This is not to say 
that perceived organizational forgiveness, as an independent variable, suffered from range 
restriction in Study 2, as responses among participants ranged from 1 to 7 on the seven-point 
response format.  However, across the two studies, there is a potential distributional 
nonequivalence, in the Cooper and Richardson (1986) sense, because values of perceived 
organizational forgiveness in Study 2 did not vary over the whole range of possible levels as did 
values in Study 1.   
Thus, it is possible that the relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and 
punitive intent observed in Study 1 is not inconsistent with that observed in Study 2.   For 
instance, the relationship between the two variables may be a nonlinear function that is not 
strictly monotonic.  In this case, the average level of punitive intent could still be lower among 
agents who see their organization as forgiving than among those who see their organization as 
                                                 
2
 By distributional nonequivalence between two variables, Cooper and Richardson (1986) meant that the realized 




unforgiving.  But among those who see the organization as forgiving (i.e., those whose mean 
perceived organizational forgiveness scores lie in the upper half of a scale using an n-point 
response format), the relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive 
intent may be positive, negative, or essentially zero, depending on the types of information 
salient to the disciplinary agent (e.g., the agent’s transgression experience, the mitigating 
circumstances surrounding the unethical act).  The potential nuances of the form of the 
relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent is an empirical 
issue that future research can explore. 
Before pointing out the implications of this dissertation for research and practice, it is 
important to consider some of its limitations and the directions for future research that these 
limitations suggest. 
Limitations 
One limitation of this dissertation is the cross-sectional design of the studies.  This is less 
of an issue for Study 1, because the predictor variables were manipulated and participants were 
randomly assigned to experimental conditions.  However, the design can raise concerns about 
causal inferences in Study 2, in which perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent 
were measured at a single point in time.  In addition, the cross-sectional design of these studies 
assumes that perceptions of organizational forgiveness are relatively stable over time.   
Controlling for the effect of the demographic and psychological covariates whose bivariate 
correlations with the punitive intent measures were statistically significant (i.e., age, sex, and 
social desirability) reduces this threat to internal validity.  Future research using longitudinal 




A second limitation is the way in which I defined and operationalized forgiveness.  
Among scholars of forgiveness within the behavioral sciences, there has been an on-going debate 
about the nature and definition of forgiveness.  Some insist on a strictly intrapersonal definition 
of forgiveness, with the process of overcoming negative cognitions, feelings, and attitudes 
towards a transgressor at its core (e.g., Aquino et al., 2003; Worthington, 2006).  Others 
acknowledge this intrapersonal component, but also emphasize an equally necessary 
interpersonal dimension that includes a transgression victim’s willingness to resume pre-
transgression patterns of interaction with the offender, manifested in actual behaviors (e.g., 
Baumeister, et al. 1998; Rusbult et al., 2005).  Although Cameron and Caza (2002) emphasized 
the intrapersonal aspects of forgiveness in workplace settings, Cameron et al. (2004) defined and 
operationalized forgiveness at the organizational level on the basis of interpersonal aspects of 
forgiveness (e.g., being compassionate, forgiving mistakes quickly).   
An assumption I made in defining perceived organizational forgiveness as an individual’s 
perception and belief that the organization and the organizational members are quick to forgive 
mistakes and missteps by other organizational members is that forgiveness subsumes both 
dimensions.  This was evident in my operationalization of perceived organizational forgiveness 
in Study 1, in which I explicitly described the forgiving organization as one in which people 
avoid dwelling on failures and past mistakes and tend to overcome resentment or ill-feelings.  
This may not have been as evident or explicit in Study 2, in which the measure of perceived 
organizational forgiveness I used (i.e., the measure developed by Cameron et al., 2004) taps 
mainly into the “forgiving mistakes” aspect of forgiveness.  Given that laypeople typically 
associate forgiveness  (or the word “forgive”) with both intrapersonal and interpersonal 




Jobe, & Lawler, 2004), assuming that the study participants also see forgiveness as subsuming 
both dimensions is a reasonable one to make.  Nevertheless, future empirical research could tease 
out the effects of each of these dimensions of forgiveness on punishment decisions. 
Third, punitive intent was measured in response to a particular incidence of employee 
theft.  There are other forms of ethical misconduct in the workplace that may be perceived either 
as more serious or less outrageous than the Steve Atkins incident. In this sense, the 
generalizability of the patterns of punitive intent observed may be limited.  That said, the 
vignette used in the studies seemed to be substantively appropriate and realistic, based on pilot-
testing.  It also appeared to be methodologically appropriate in terms of reducing the likelihood 
of ceiling and floor effects.   
Given these limitations, the results of these empirical studies still have important 
implications for the study not only of punishment, but also of forgiveness.  In addition, these 
findings have potential implications for the practice of management. 
Implications for Research 
This dissertation extends research on punishment decision-making in several ways.  First, 
it highlights the role played by contextual factors in shaping punishment decisions.  Although 
extant research in social psychology (e.g., Darley et al., 2000; Carlsmith, 2006) has demonstrated 
the influence of contextual factors on punishment decision-making, these factors have, for the 
most part, been circumstances surrounding the object of the punishment – the perpetrator or the 
transgression.  In demonstrating that a disciplinary agent’s perceived organizational forgiveness 
influences her punishment decisions, this dissertation incorporates the decision-maker’s context 
as an antecedent to punishment decisions.  It thereby calls attention to the role of factors that are 




Theoretically, incorporating elements of the decision-maker’s context into models of punishment 
decision-making facilitates the development of more comprehensive models explaining 
intentions to punish.   Given that variation in punishment decisions is not entirely explained by 
elements of the transgression or characteristics of the transgressor, examining perceived 
organizational forgiveness (and other similar organizational context factors) as antecedent to 
punishment decisions raises interesting questions and opens opportunities to examine more 
subtle influences that shape punitive judgment.  Much of the debate within social psychology 
regarding the motives individuals have for punishing assumes that punishment justifications 
(e.g., retribution, incapacitation, moral outrage) and attributions are associated with unique 
aspects of transgressions (see Carlsmith, 2006).  Examining perceived organizational forgiveness 
and other similar factors regarding the disciplinary agent’s context relaxes such assumptions, as 
well as assumptions about the rationality of the agent and the sources of her moral outrage.  To 
the extent that a disciplinary agent’s perceptions regarding the unethicality of a morally 
questionable act are indicative of her moral outrage and ethical tolerance, the post-hoc analyses 
presented in the second study suggest that a combination of contextual factors that are 
forgiveness-related have the potential to make individuals more ethically sensitive.  In other 
words, these findings suggest that the moral outrage that drives punishment intentions may be 
influenced by contextual factors independent of the offense that is the target of punishment.   
Second, this dissertation proposed and demonstrated that punishment, at least from a 
disciplinary agent’s perspective, is related to forgiveness.  Although philosophers, theologians, 
and lay persons have long associated forgiveness with punishment and have grappled with the 
nuances surrounding the relationship between these two concepts, social scientists have, for the 




behavioral sciences are recent work by Aquino, Bies, and Tripp (e.g., Aquino, Bies, & Tripp, 
2006; Tripp, Bies, & Aquino, 2007), which has examined punitive revenge and forgiveness as 
alternative responses to interpersonal transgressions.  Considering forgiveness as a contextual 
variable (cf. Cameron et al., 2004), I extend the literature on punishment by integrating the role 
that forgiveness plays as an antecedent to punishment decisions.   
One by-product of examining forgiveness as an antecedent to punitive intent is that this 
dissertation also extends research on the interpersonal consequences of forgiveness.  Whereas 
there has been a rich literature on the intrapersonal consequences of forgiveness (e.g., the health 
benefits of forgiving to the forgiving individual), there has been very limited study regarding the 
consequences of forgiveness on individuals who have been forgiven or unforgiven (for recent 
exceptions, see Kelln and Ellard, 1999 and Wallace et al., 2008).  In particular, the results of this 
dissertation draw attention to potential unintended consequences of forgiveness on individuals 
who are not the victims of transgression.  Scholars of the positive psychology and positive 
organizational behavior traditions have viewed forgiveness as good and unforgiveness as less 
than desirable.  To the extent that moralistic punishment (i.e., punishing ethical misconduct) is 
“good” and “ethical,” the results of these dissertation studies suggest that an unforgiving context 
may also promote judgment that is “good” and “ethical” among disciplinary agents.   
In Study 1, the mean intention to punish and mean proposed sanction were highest among 
participants assigned to the condition where the organizational context was unforgiving and the 
negative consequences of the ethical misconduct to the organization were severe.  That the 
confidence interval of the mean intention to punish and confidence interval of proposed sanction 
did not overlap (for the most part) with the other confidence intervals of the mean in this 




intent were less likely to be the result of unsystematic variability in the dependent measures.  In 
addition, this suggests that higher punishment intentions were driven by an unforgiving context, 
in combination with a serious offense.   
In Study 2, the mean intention to punish and mean proposed sanction were apparently 
highest among participants assigned to the contextually dissonant condition of having been 
denied forgiveness in a forgiving organization.  Given the pattern of results in Study 1, these 
results raise the possibility that an unforgiving context, whether in terms of a psychological 
climate or a salient personal experience, may interact with other contextual factors to induce 
disciplinary agents to engage in higher levels of moralistic punishment.   
Lastly, the results of this dissertation suggest that scholars studying punishment should 
take a second look at criterion variables used in punishment research.  Although the two 
measures of punitive intent, intention to punish and proposed sanctions, were significantly 
correlated in both studies, they differed in terms of the extent to which they were influenced by 
perceived organizational forgiveness and the moderators used.  In previous experimental studies 
on punishment in social psychology, similar “dual operationalizations” of punishment have been 
used.  For instance, in the research of Darley and colleagues (e.g., Carlsmith et al., 2002; Darley 
et al., 2000), “appropriate punishment severity,” analogous to the intention to punish measure 
used in this dissertation, usually appears as a two-item measure with a seven-point response 
format.  A “sentencing scale,” analogous to the proposed sanction measure used in this 
dissertation, usually appears in a 13-point response format ranging from not guilty to life 
sentence.  Similar to the results of this dissertation, those previous studies have reported high 
correlations between these analogous dependent measures (i.e., as high as .91).  However, 




patterns of results across the two measures.  Apart from psychometric differences between the 
measures used in this dissertation and the measures used in previous studies, one factor that may 
explain the differences in patterns of results between intention to punish and proposed sanction is 
the context in which experimental studies on punishment have been carried out.  For instance, 
business students with work experience who are tasked to punish an unethical employee (as is 
the case in these dissertation studies) may draw a sharper distinction between their desire to 
punish and the actual sanction they propose than undergraduate students who are tasked to 
punish an individual guilty of violating criminal statutes (as is the case in the other social 
psychology studies).  Whether the “psychological proximity” between the participants and the 
transgressors, or some other factor, is driving the difference in the pattern of results found in this 
dissertation is a question for future research on punishment decision-making.   
 Aside from these research implications, the findings from this dissertation also have 
potential implications for practice. 
Implications for Practice 
The results of these studies suggest that at least under certain conditions, perceptions of 
organizational forgiveness have the potential of shaping punishment decisions in the workplace.  
Recognizing this, human resource managers may want to take such perceptions into account 
when reviewing formal disciplinary actions recommended or imposed by self-managed teams 
and by first-level supervisors in response to ethical misconduct.  This may prove useful in 
attenuating high levels of disciplinary sanctions that might have come about as the result of 
considerations only remotely related to the ethical misconduct.  Doing so would likely go a long 




Conversely, given the benefits of having a forgiving organization in terms of encouraging 
innovation (Cameron et al., 2004), managers may want to be cautious in promoting perceptions 
of organizational forgiveness. Engaging in ways to enhance perceived organizational forgiveness 
may result in the application of weak sanctions in response to ethical misconduct.  To the extent 
that imposing weak sanctions for ethical violations is perceived as tolerance for unethical 
behavior, having a high level of perceived organizational forgiveness among employees may 
serve to counteract ethical initiatives of the organization, by making people unwilling to punish 
appropriately and to administer negative sanctions against unethical conduct.  Worse, high levels 
of perceived organizational forgiveness may promote a false impression that ethically 
questionable acts will not necessarily be punished, and are therefore acceptable.   
Summary 
There are many potential factors that influence the punishment decisions made by 
individuals in response to ethical misconduct in the workplace.  In this dissertation, I proposed 
that a disciplinary agent’s perceived organizational forgiveness and the agent’s punitive intent 
would be negatively related, such that agents who see their organization as forgiving will tend to 
punish less severely than agents who see their organization as unforgiving.  Evidence from the 
two studies I conducted yielded equivocal results.  Data from the lab study were consistent with 
this main hypothesis and suggest that this relationship holds when the disciplinary agent is high 
in accountability and is punishing in response to misconduct that has resulted in serious damage 
to the organization.  Data from the field study did not support this main hypothesis.  Instead, this 
negative relationship seemed to hold only when an experience of being forgiven was salient in 
the mind of the disciplinary agent and there were mitigating circumstances surrounding the 




a positive relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent when an 
experience of being denied forgiveness is salient to the disciplinary agent.  In this final chapter, I 
proposed a possible explanation for reconciling these seemingly inconsistent findings.  I also 
pointed out limitations of these studies and the future directions for research that these 
limitations suggest.  Finally, I suggested that the results of this dissertation might have several 
important implications to research on punishment and forgiveness and to the practice of 





















10847 W Sand Lake St., Orlando, FL 32819 
 
M E M O R A N D U M 
 
 
TO: Chris Meyer, Assistant Manager 
 
FROM: James Walters, Controller 
 
RE: Steve Atkins Incident 
 
DATE: October 16, 2007 
 
CC: Mary Copeland, Manager 
 
As per your request, here is what I found out about Steve Atkins, our assistant in charge of ordering and 
receiving restaurant equipment and supplies, based on reliable information I have gathered from other employees.  
In the delivery for the week ending July 6, 2007, Steve discovered an espresso maker that, by some mistake, was not 
ordered and did not appear on the invoice.  Steve took the espresso maker home.  Our supplier, Jensen Marketing, 
did not know about Steve’s actions until early last week.  Unfortunately, based on my conversation with Jensen’s 
representative, Steve’s actions seemed to have made them seriously doubt our credibility as a business customer, 
which may likely result in more stringent and costly delivery processes for us. 
 
At the minimum, we have to ask Steve to return what he took.  Of course, you know what people say 
around here: everyone deserves a second chance.  There are additional sanctions you may want to consider, such as 
suspension without pay or even termination. 
 
Let me know if you need more information to make your decision. 
 
Chris – I’m sure other managers and assistant managers will be interested to see how you deal with this 
case and how you will justify your decision.  To make things easier for you, I attached on the next page a 


















10847 W Sand Lake St., Orlando, FL 32819 
 
M E M O R A N D U M 
 
TO: Chris Meyer, Asst. Manager 
 
FROM: Barbara Brown, Senior Admin. Asst. 
 
RE: Steve Atkins Incident 
 
Chris – Indicate the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements. Please circle one 
number, according to the following scale. 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly disagree      Strongly agree 
 
1. What Steve did was a major breach of ethical standards. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2.  I intend to punish Steve severely. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3.  Steve’s actions constitute grave misconduct. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4.  I plan to impose a stiff penalty on Steve for his actions. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5.  What Steve did constitutes a serious offense. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6.  I am inclined to enforce serious negative sanctions on Steve. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
In addition to asking Steve to return  what he took, should we impose an additional sanction on him? 


































In addition to your response above, do you have any comments?  
 
 ______________________________________________________________________________________ 
















Now that you have finished the "in-basket," we want to know your perceptions about Jake’s.  
In completing this part, it is very important that you do not turn back to any of the preceding 
parts.  Please respond to the items below based upon the impressions you formed while playing 
the role of Chris Meyer, Assistant Manager. 
 
To what extent does each of the following statements characterize Jake’s ?  Please use the 
following scale to record your responses. Write the most appropriate number in the blank to the 































Jake’s  is a company where people… 
______   1. are professional. 
 ______   2.  are forgiving. 
______   3. are generous. 
 ______   4. achieve desired results. 
______   5. dwell on past mistakes or bad decisions. 
______   6. believe in customer service. 
______   7. can be counted on to achieve results. 
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